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ing guidance from an administrative agency before acting has often
come to be unavoidable. This article will explore some of the benefits and risks of seeking such guidance, with particular reference to
the law of North Carolina.
Since it is now unsafe to assume that any activity is free from
government control, the questions presented for agency ruling are
as varied as the activities of man. Must I comply with environmental regulations or other regulatory laws before constructing a new
plant? Do I have to get a license before engaging in a proposed
activity, and if so, how do I qualify? If I already have a license,
does it authorize me to broaden my activities to a related field?
How broad are the disciplinary powers of the licensing agency?
Can I get a favorable interpretation of the tax laws before I commit myself to a proposed transaction? Are the working conditions
in my place of business subject to both federal and state regulation, and if so, are they reconcilable? How does the Federal Trade
Commission interpret its powers over my little dry goods store
under the numerous statutes that it administers? Has an agency
adopted new regulations which require me to change my present
activities? Can I get a government grant, and if so, how? The list
could go on and on.
Answers to these questions and thousands of others like them
may be necessary before action is taken. When a client consults his
lawyer about a proposed business or professional activity, it is essential that the lawyer anticipate questions about government regulations and benefits and know where to get the answers. Sometimes all that the client wants is to remove uncertainty; he is
willing to do whatever the agency may require of him, provided
that he can find out what the agency does require and that he can
rely on what it tells him. More often he hopes for a particular answer that will excuse him from complying with a regulation, dispense with the necessity of a license, interpret an existing license
favorably, minimize his taxes, keep the government inspectors
away from his door or get him a government grant. In a doubtful
case, where he seeks an agency's advice and the answer disappoints
him, he may choose to disregard the advice and hope that unpleasant consequences do not follow, or he may modify or abandon the
project or he may attempt to overturn the agency's answer in the
courts. In each such case, counsel must be prepared to advise him
on the risks and chances of success.
Under the law and practice of North Carolina, as well as that
of other states and the United States, there are basically two aphttp://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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proaches which an attorney can take in seeking guidance from an
administrative agency. The first is the informal approach, which
may consist of telephoning someone in the agency or writing a letter to the agency and asking for advice on the facts presented,
which may be existing or hypothetical. The answer, if any, will
probably come from a subordinate employee of the agency and
very likely will contain a reservation to the effect that it shall not
be binding on the agency in the event of subsequent litigation.
This informal procedure is the one generally followed by those
seeking advice.' However, it has grave risks to the advice-seeker, as
we shall see hereafter. The second approach is more formal and
consists of a petition to the agency for a declaratory ruling on a
statement of facts submitted. The administrative procedure acts of
North Carolina and many other jurisdictions now provide for the
issuance of such declaratory rulings and the effect to be given to
them.2 This approach avoids most of the risks of the informal one
but has serious problems of its own.
If the foregoing approaches have been exhausted without success, or if statutes or regulations are so clearly contrary to the client's wishes that it seems useless to pursue them, the possibility
1. M. AzIMow, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 141 (1973), reported that all twenty-six federal agencies studied regularly
gave informal advice in large volume. Information collected by the present author
from a number of North Carolina agencies indicates that all give informal advice
but that only the Department of Human Resources has had any substantial number of requests for formal declaratory rulings. 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 239 (1965), reports that informal inquiry is "the method by far most commonly employed" to obtain advisory opinions from state administrative agencies.
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-706 (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-176 (West
1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1508 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.565 (West Supp.
1974-75); GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-112 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-8 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 67-5208 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 1009 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A-9 (West 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:962 (West Supp.
1979); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 9001 (1979); MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 250 (1978);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3560(163) (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-4218 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-912 (1976); NEv. REV. STAT. § 233B-120 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541A-8 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-8 (West 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-9
(1978); N.Y. [A.P.A.] LAW 56A, § 204 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A17 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 307 (West 1965); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.410
(1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-8 (1956); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-15
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-513 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 808 (1972); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04-080 (1962); W. VA. CODE § 29A-4-1 (1976); WIS. STAT.
ANN.

§ 227.06 (West 1957).
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remains of attempting to get the legislature to change the statute
or attempting to get the agency to change its regulations. The former lies wholly within the political field and is beyond the scope of
this article. However, if it is not the statute itself but an agency
regulation that stands in the way, the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act has provided a means of compelling the agency
either to change the regulation or to give reasons why it refuses to
do so.'
We shall therefore discuss in the subsequent sections (1) informal requests to the agency for advice, (2) petitions to the agency
for declaratory rulings and (3) petitions to the agency for the promulgation, amendment or repeal of rules.
II.

INFORMAL REQUESTS FOR ADVICE

In order to illustrate in a concrete way the problems which
may arise in seeking agency advice, let us take a rather simple set
of facts. Assume that your client is licensed as a hearing aid salesman by the North Carolina Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters Board
and must retain his license in order to continue his occupation."
Confident of the virtues of the products that he sells, he has told
three recent purchasers that, if the hearing aids they purchased
from him did not improve their hearing within sixty days, they
could return the aids for full refund. The three customers have
now tendered back the aids and demanded refunds. He believes
that their claims of lack of improvement of hearing are unfounded
but is fearful that, if he refuses the refunds, his license may be
revoked.5 Your examination of the statute discloses that the only
arguably relevant ground for revocation is "gross incompetence."0
You telephone the agency, furnish the facts and inquire whether
refusal of the refunds could be considered "gross incompetence."
After an appropriate interval, an attorney on the agency's staff
writes you a letter giving his opinion.
The facts assumed in the preceding paragraph can be used to
illustrate the following dangers of asking agency advice:
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-16 (1978).
4. Id. ch. 93D (1975).
5. The illustrative case is adapted with changes from Faulkner v. North Carolina State Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters Bd., 38 N.C. App. 222, 247 S.E.2d 668
(1978), which involved a licensee of the North Carolina Hearing Aid Dealers and
Fitters Board.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-13(a)(2) (1975).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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(1) If the advice is favorable, the agency cannot be compelled
to adhere to it. Advice from the staff attorney that refusal of refunds does not represent "gross incompetence," because those
words refer only to technical expertise in practicing the profession
of hearing aid salesman, would not be binding on the agency in
subsequent proceedings to revoke the salesman's license. In most
cases, of course, the agency will not overrule the advice of its staff,
so far as it applies to the person to whom the advice was given.
Nevertheless, the duty of the agency to follow the law as declared
in statutes, regulations and court decisions might influence it to
disregard erroneous advice. Furthermore, it is well settled in North
Carolina that the state, unlike a private individual, cannot be estopped from disputing erroneous statements made by one of its
employees, even though the advisee was intended to and did rely
on them.8 The United States Supreme Court has taken the same
position, so far as advice from a subordinate employee is concerned. 9 Therefore, the salesman in our illustration can refuse to
7. M. AzIMow, supra note 1, at § 13.02. Most federal agencies will not, as a
matter of policy, retroactively change advice to the detriment of the person receiving it, but the policy has not been spelled out. The North Carolina Department of Human Resources, which gives a large volume of advice by both telephone and letter, has informed the author that it has no rule on the matter but
that it has a policy of not changing such advice retroactively. This situation seems
to be typical of state agencies. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 244.
8. Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961) (illegal
issuance of building permit by city official does not estop city from enforcing zoning ordinance after reliance by permittee); City of Raleigh v. Fisher, 232 N.C. 629,
61 S.E.2d 897 (1950) (collection by city of privilege tax for conducting a business
on certain premises did not estop city from contending that use of premises for
that purpose was illegal); Henderson v. Gill, 229 N.C. 313, 49 S.E.2d 754 (1948)
(advice by state auditor that certain items were not subject to sales tax did not
estop state from collecting tax on said items for the same years); Mecklenberg
County v. Westbery, 32 N.C. App. 630, 233 S.E.2d 658 (1977) (city was not estopped from denying the validity of a building permit).
However, where a zoning ordinance authorizes a zoning officer to exercise discretion in classifying a permitted use, his lawful exercise of that discretion binds
the city and the question of estoppel does not arise. City of Winston-Salem v.
Hoots Concrete Co., 37 N.C. App. 186, 245 S.E.2d 536, pet. for disc. review denied, 295 N.C. 645, 248 S.E.2d 249 (1978).
9. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965) (reliance on acquiescence of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in Tax Court decisions does not estop government from retroactive taxation); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180
(1957) (ruling that organization was exempt from income tax does not prevent
retroactive imposition of tax); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380
(1947) (advice from subordinate employee that crop was insurable does not re-
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make the refunds only at the risk of subsequent proceedings to
revoke his license for such refusal. Of course, he may succeed in
overturning the revocation in court, but even then he may have to
endure a temporary suspension of his license pending judicial review 0 and will always incur a substantial period of uncertainty
and considerable litigation expense.
(2) If the advice is unfavorable, it cannot be challenged on
judicial review. An important circumstance bearing on the correctness of agency advice is the tendency of agency personnel to believe that they should have power to deal with any wrong in the
field subject to their control and that therefore their statutory
powers must necessarily be construed to cover all such wrongs,
even if the statutory language must be stretched to cover them.
Such was the attitude of the Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters
Board, which construed "gross incompetence" to include alleged
failure to honor a warranty to customers that the aids would improve their hearing." Therefore, unless the person to whom the
advice is given can obtain judicial review at this stage, he may have
to live with a statutory interpretation that claims for the agency
far more power than the legislature intended itto have.
It is clear that he cannot obtain judicial review of such agency
staff advice. Courts in North Carolina and elsewhere have uniformly required that administrative remedies be exhausted and
that the issue presented to the court be ripe for judicial review.
The exhaustion doctrine requires that the decision appealed from
quire payment of loss where lawful regulations forbade coverage). See collection
of cases in M. AzIMow, supra note 1, ch. 3 at 31 (where it is stated that federal
agency policy is often in favor of not imposing retroactive penalties where advice
has been relied on, but "the larger agencies typically would be reluctant to consider themselves bound by reliance interests created by informal advice given by
low-level employees, especially if it was egregiously in error,") and ch. 8 (discussing policies of the individual agencies on this point).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-48 (1978) does not authorize the Superior Court
to stay the effectiveness of a termination order until the termination becomes
final, even though the terminated employee alleges that he has no income to support his family pending the completion of the administrative proceedings. Stevenson v. North Carolina Dept. of Ins., 31 N.C. App. 299, 229 S.E.2d 209 (1976), cert.
denied, 291 N.C. 450, 230 S.E.2d 767 (1977). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-44 (1978)
permits judicial intervention before the completion of the administrative process
only in case of "unreasonable delay" by the agency. Davis v. North Carolina Dept.
of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978).
11. Faulkner v. North Carolina State Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters Bd., 38
N.C. App. 222, 247 S.E.2d 668 (1978).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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represent the agency's final action, which means that the Board
itself, rather than a member of the staff, must issue a final ruling
on the matter.1 2 The ripeness doctrine requires that a concrete justiciable controversy be presented to the court, which can be disposed of by the court's decision, and it therefore precludes judicial
consideration of advice which does not present the elements of
such a controversy. 3
The consequence is that, unless the person inquiring of the
agency is prepared to live with the agency's advice, whichever way
it goes, he may be better off not to seek it. If the advice in a doubtful case is unfavorable, and he proceeds contrary to it, he has been
put on notice of the agency's position and may be subject to penalties for wilful violation of law."' If he does not seek the advice, he
can plausibly assert that he proceeded in good faith and, even if
mistaken, may at least escape the charge of wilfulness. Since the
agency cannot be compelled to adhere to favorable advice (al12. U.S.: Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967) (regulation prescribing change in labeling of drugs held immediately reviewable because it was
"promulgated in a formal manner," was "definitive" was not "the ruling of a
subordinate official ...

or tentative" and "compliance was expected"). Compare

United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (refusing to review validity
of statute on basis of informal ruling given over the telephone by subordinate
agency) with International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954)
(refusing to enjoin Immigration Service from departing from ruling made by District Director).
N.C.: Cameron v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 36 N.C. App. 547, 244 S.E.2d
497 (1978); Freeland v. Greene, 33 N.C. App. 537, 235 S.E.2d 852 (1977); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978) ("Any person ...
who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review").
13. Discussed in III.G., infra.
14. U.S.: Statutes frequently empower the agency to fix civil penalties in substantial amounts. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (1976) (authorized the Federal
Trade Commission to recover a civil penalty up to $10,000 for violation of one of
its rules respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices with actual knowledge
that the act is prohibited by the rule, and the following paragraph (C) makes each
day of failure to comply a separate offense). The fine continues to accumulate
even during a good faith contest in court. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,
368 U.S. 208 (1961).
N.C.: Regulatory statutes generally provide that violation of any provision
shall be a misdemeanor. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-15 (1975). Statutes authorizing an agency to impose civil penalties are subject to the requirement of N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 3 that penalties be "reasonably necessary" to the agency's purposes. State ex rel Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968) (statute
%
authorizing agency to fix penalty held invalid).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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though it may voluntarily do so) and cannot be challenged in court
on unfavorable advice, an attorney who has sought such advice
must still face the responsibility of determining the law for
himself.
The North Carolina legislature has sought to resolve this problem by a provision for declaratory rulings by agencies, which we
shall now discuss.

III.
A.

REQUESTS FOR DECLARATORY RULINGS

NORTH CAROLINA STATUTES GOVERNING DECLARATORY RULINGS
BY AGENCIES

North Carolina's Administrative Procedure Act, effective February 1, 1976 (hereinafter "the Act" or "NCAPA"), is contained in
chapter 150A of the General Statutes."5 It attempts to provide machinery whereby "any person aggrieved" may obtain from an
agency a declaratory ruling which will overcome the two basic inadequacies of informal advice, viz, that such advice is probably not
binding on the agency even though relied upon and that such advice probably does not present a justiciable controversy subject to
judicial review. Whether the Act accomplishes these purposes can
only be determined by detailed consideration of its provisions.
Agency activity subject to the Act is generally divided into two
mutually exclusive categories: (1) "rules" are defined as "each
agency regulation, standard or statement of general applicability
that implements or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements of any agency." 1 Excluded from the definition of rules are declaratory rulings, statements of policy or interpretations that are made in the decision of
a contested case and some other categories of lesser public importance. (2) "Contested cases" are defined as "any agency proceeding
. . wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity
for an adjudicatory hearing. 1 7 Included in this definition are ratemaking, price-fixing and licensing. Excluded are rulemaking, declaratory rulings or the award or denial of a scholarship or grant.
Corresponding to this dichotomy are the procedures pre*

15. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -63 (1978) (& Supp. 1979). The Act was
adapted from the MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, 13 U.L.A. §§ 1-

15 (Supp. 1979).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-10 (1978).

17. Id. § 150A-2(2).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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scribed by the Act. Minimum procedural requirements for
"rulemaking" are notice by publication and by mailing to all persons who have requested notice, and a public hearing pursuant to
the notice at which the agency shall "consider fully all oral and
written submissions respecting the proposed rule." 18 The Act specifically provides that the public hearing is not subject to the provisions of the Act on contested cases, i.e., it is not a trial. The Act
provides for filing of rules with the Attorney General and publication of rules by him. 19 Rules have been filed with the Attorney
General, but they have not yet been published, due to the failure
of the legislature to provide funds for this purpose.20 Minimum
procedural requirements for a "contested case" include notice to
the parties of the time and place of hearing, opportunity to present
evidence and arguments, cross-examination, right to subpoena witnesses and take depositions, observance of court rules of evidence
except where evidence is "not reasonably available under such
rules," designation of a hearing officer with powers substantially
equivalent to those of a trial judge, proposal for decision by the
hearing officer, final decision by the agency and an official record
of the proceedings as a basis for review.21
The judicial review created by the Act is limited by section
150A-43 to review of "a final agency decision in a contested case,"
after the person aggrieved by the decision "has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency
rule." Although the declaratory ruling is not a "contested case,"
section 150A-17 provides that it "is subject to judicial review in the
same manner as an agency final decision in a contested case."
There is no express provision in the Act for review of an agency
rule. However, the same section 150A-43 that creates a right of review under the Act also states that, if some other statute provides
"adequate procedure for judicial review," such other statute governs. The final sentence of this section preserves "any judicial remedy available.

. .

under the law to test the validity of any admin-

18. Id. § 150A-12(e).
19. Id. §§ 150A-58 to -64.
20. Copies of rules may be obtained either from the agency issuing them or
from the Administrative Procedure Section of the Attorney General's Office in
Raleigh. Rules are identified by (1) a title number assigned to the particular
agency, (2) the letters N.C.A.C., designating North Carolina Administrative Code,
(3) a chapter or subchapter number and (4) the rule number. For further details
see Appendix A, infra.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-23 to -37 (1978).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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istrative action not made reviewable under this Article," a
provision which may be applicable to rules. It appears, therefore,
that an "adequate" judicial remedy under another statute, the judicial remedy created by the Act and the other judicial remedies
"available under the law" represent three mutually exclusive categories, so22 that a given agency action is reviewable under only one
of them.

As the above summary of the NCAPA indicates, declaratory
rulings by agencies are neither "rules" nor "contested cases," although they are "subject to judicial review in the same manner" as
decisions in contested cases. What they are, and the procedures
applicable to their issuance, must be determined from the only section of the Act expressly dealing with such rulings, which reads in
its entirety:23
150A-17. Declaratory rulings. On request of a person aggrieved,
an agency shall issue a declaratory ruling as to the validity of a

rule or as to the applicability to a given state of facts of a statute
administered by the agency or of a rule or order of the agency,
except where the agency for good cause finds issuance of a ruling
undersirable. The agency shall prescribe in its rules the circumstances in which rulings shall or shall not be issued. A declaratory
ruling is binding on the agency and the person requesting it unless it is altered or set aside by the court. An agency may not
retroactively change a declaratory ruling, but nothing in this sec22. Such was the interpretation of comparable language in the former statute, Judicial Review of Decisions of Certain Administrative Agencies, 1973 N.C.
Sess. Laws ch. 1331, § 2, as amended by 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 69, § 3. The
statute did not apply to revocation of a real estate broker's license where the law
regulating brokers provided "adequate procedure" for judicial review. In re Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962). The statute applied exclusively to
an order forfeiting a bid bond, which was within its coverage. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Lentz, 31 N.C. App. 88, 228 S.E.2d 516 (1976). Certiorari will not lie
where a statute provides an orderly procedure for appeal available to the party; in
absence of statute, courts have inherent power to review by certiorari upon showing that the agency has acted "arbitrarily, capriciously or in disregard of law." In
re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (1978). For comparative purposes, the corresponding section of the REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
13 U.L.A. § 8 (Supp. 1979), reads as follows:
§ 8. Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency. Rulings disposing of
petitions have the same status as agency decisions or orders in contested
cases.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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tion prevents an agency from prospectively changing a declaratory ruling. A declaratory ruling is subject to judicial review in
the same manner as an agency final decision or order in a contested case. Failure of the agency to issue a declaratory ruling on
the merits within 60 days of the request for such ruling shall constitute a denial of the request as well as a denial of the merits of
the request and shall be subject to judicial review.
Pursuant to the requirements of this section, most state agencies
have adopted and filed with the Attorney General rules governing
the issuance of declaratory rulings. Since these rules can be inspected only in the Attorney General's Office in Raleigh, basic information concerning the classification system and representative
samples of the rules adopted pursuant to section 150A-17 have
been gathered in appendices to this article for the convenience of
the reader.2 4 Particular provisions of the rules will be referred to in
the discussion which follows.
Administrative practice under section 150A-17 has just begun
to develop. Many of the questions raised by this section, and by
the necessity of attempting to fit it into the statutory scheme,
therefore remain unanswered, either at the agency level or the judicial level. In the following discussion of these questions, we shall
refer to North Carolina authority where it is available; but, where
it is unavailable or inconclusive, we shall cite cases dealing with
similar questions under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
(hereinafter "Federal APA"),2 5 and cases from other states having
comparable statutes, as guides to the probable development of the
law under the North Carolina Act.
B.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION
REMEDIES

AND

EXHAUSTION

OF ADMINISTRATIVE

The first and most fundamental question is whether the declaratory remedy provided by section 150A-17 must be invoked
prior to seeking judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute or
an invalid or ambiguous agency rule, or whether a petitioner may
proceed directly to court when only a question of law is presented.
Here we encounter two fundamental principles of administrative
law, which will compel him in almost all cases to seek the agency
remedy first. One principle is that of "primary jurisdiction," based
on the fact that the agency is not part of the judicial system but is
24. See appendices A and B, infra.
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
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an independent body deriving its powers from the legislature. This
principle declares that, where the agency has jurisdiction and is
able to grant a remedy, the petitioner must first resort to the
agency and give it an opportunity to afford that remedy. The other
principle is that of "exhaustion of administrative remedies," which
declares that, once having invoked the agency's jurisdiction, a petitioner must proceed to a final decision by the agency before seeking relief in the courts. This requirement has been established not
only out of respect for the independence of the agency, and the
desirability of a uniform course of decision in matters within the
agency's powers, but also to insure that the case ultimately
presented to the court will be fully developed and will carry with it
the agency's judgment on the issues. Both principles were well established by judicial decision in North Carolina prior to the adoption of the NCAPA. 26 The exhaustion principle has been expressly
adopted by section 150A-43, which provides that judicial review
shall be of "a final agency decision" and that the petitioner must
have "exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him
by statute or agency rule." One of these remedies is, of course, the
new declaratory proceeding provided in section 150A-17.
Analysis of the language of section 150A-17 supports the conclusion that the remedy under that section must be invoked and
exhausted before appealing to the courts. This section, unlike the
comparable provisions of the Federal APA and the administrative
procedure acts of many other states, provides that an agency
"shall issue a declaratory ruling . . ., except where the agency for
good cause finds issuance of a ruling undesirable" (emphasis added).2 The mandatory language, coupled with the requirement
26. King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 316, 172 S.E.2d 12 (1970); Elmore v. Lanier,
270 N.C. 674, 155 S.E.2d 114 (1967); Garner v. Weston, 263 N.C. 487, 139 S.E.2d
642 (1965); Sinodis v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 258 N.C. 282, 128 S.E.2d 587
(1962); Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Kermon, 232 N.C. 342, 60 S.E.2d 580 (1950);
In re Wright, 228 N.C. 301, 45 S.E.2d 370 (1947); Davis v. North Carolina Dep't
of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978); Cameron v. Wake County Bd.
of Educ., 36 N.C. App. 547, 244 S.E.2d 497 (1978); Freeland v. Greene, 33 N.C.
App. 537, 235 S.E.2d 852 (1977); Church v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 31 N.C.
App. 641, 230 S.E.2d 769 (1976), cert. denied, 292 N.C. 264, 233 S.E.2d 391
(1977); Stevenson v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 31 N.C. App. 299, 229 S.E.2d
209 (1976).
27. The administrative procedure acts of other states, with the exception of
New Mexico, provide that the agency "may issue" declaratory rulings or contain
other language which is clearly permissive, thus vesting nonreviewable discretion
in the agency. See supra note 2. The Federal APA provides that the agency "in
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that refusal must be based on a finding of "good cause," seems to
make clear that the agency carries the burden of showing good
cause for failure to act. The further provision that failure to issue
the ruling for sixty days "shall constitute a denial of the request as
well as a denial of the merits of the request and shall be subject to
judicial review" (emphasis added) apparently authorizes the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency on
the merits whenever the agency fails or refuses to issue a declaratory ruling for any reason. This unique provision, depriving the
agency of its jurisdiction over the subject matter unless it
promptly issues the requested ruling, should provide a powerful
sanction to create hospitality towards the granting of declaratory
rulings. Thus the prompt and adequate agency remedy provided
by section 150A-17 supports the conclusion that it grants primary
jurisdiction to the agency on all matters coming within its
coverage. 2"
C.

SUBJECT MATTER OF DECLARATORY RULINGS

Obviously section 150A-17 should require prior resort to the
agency only in those cases where the section empowers the agency
to grant an adequate remedy.2 9 Determination of the agency's powits sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1976). Fury
thermore, the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act grants concurrent jurisdiction to the courts to issue declaratory judgments on the validity or
applicability of a rule, a provision which would clearly negative primary jurisdiction in the agency over those subjects. 13 U.L.A. § 7 (Supp. 1979).
28. Such have been the holdings in the only North Carolina cases which have
so far passed on the question. Porter v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 40 N.C. App.
376, 253 S.E.2d 44 (1979) (licensee who claimed that agency rule did not apply to
him or was invalid must first seek its amendment under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A16 (1978) or a declaratory ruling under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (1978)); High
Rock Lake Assn. v. Environmental Mgt. Comm'n., 39 N.C. App. 699, 252 S.E.2d
109 (1979) (objectors to a rule allowing substantial use of water under the Water
Use Act must first seek a declaratory ruling from the agency pursuant to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (1978)).
29. Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979) (remedy held not
adequate where plaintiff alleged continuing failure by board of elections to require students to prove residence as condition of voting, and only administrative
remedy was by individual challenge to 6,000 to 10,000 voters); Williams v. Greene,
36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156 (1978) (remedy for alleged wrongful discharge
held adequate where plaintiff would be compensated by back pay and reinstatement). To the same effect are cases from the United States courts, e.g., Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (semble as to Civil Aeronautics
Board's power to protect airlines against common-law liability by awarding pasPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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ers under that section therefore involves the following inquiries: (1)
What questions of law may the agency decide by declaratory ruling? (2) In determining those questions of law, is the agency limited to the "given state of facts" presented to it by the petitioner,
or may it develop additional facts or resolve disputed issues of fact
to arrive at the "given" facts? (3) Must the "given state of facts"
on which the agency bases its decision be sufficiently concrete to
authorize a court to render a declaratory judgment on them, or
may they be hypothetical?
(1) What questions of law may the agency decide by declaratory ruling? This question appears to be susceptible of a fairly
definitive answer. Clearly omitted from the authority delegated is
the power to pass upon the validity of any statute, including the
statute creating the agency and defining its powers. This omission
comports with the rule often stated in the cases, which reserves
such constitutional questions to the courts.3 0 Section 150A-17 limits the agency to "the validity of a rule" or "the applicability to a
given state of facts of a statute administered by the agency or of a
rule or order of the agency." Thus rulings are authorized on two
basic types of issues: (a) the validity of a rule, which may be a
purely legal question involving the issues of whether the rule was
within the power delegated to the agency by the legislature,
whether it was adopted pursuant to lawful procedure and whether
it is rational or arbitrary;3 (b) the application to the "given" facts
senger penalty provided by regulations); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324
(1969) (National Labor Relations Board had no power to grant relief, so court
could take jurisdiction). As to the federal law, see generally B. MEZINES, J. STEIN
& J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 49.02 (1979).
30. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (exhaustion was not required
where the only issue raised was the constitutionality of the agency's denial of a
pretermination hearing on benefits); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 20.00-1 (1976); 2 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 579.
31. "Rule" is used in the sense defined in the NCAPA, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
150A-10 (1978). The tests for validity of a rule stated in the text are supported by
text writers, 1 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 250-65; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 5.03 (1958); 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law §§ 296-304 (1962). An
agency rule within statutory and constitutional powers has the force and effect of
law, Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 342-43, 88 S.E.2d 333,
340-41 (1955); but a rule imposing requirements additional to those authorized by
statute is invalid and cannot be saved by striking from it the invalid portion,
States' Rights Democratic Party v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 229
N.C. 179, 49 S.E.2d 379 (1948). The agency power to make rules "carries with it
the responsibility not only to remain consistent with the governing legislation,
• . . but also to employ procedures that conform to the law." Morton v. Ruiz, 415
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of a statute, rule or agency order. This second category appears

broad enough to permit the agency to pass on almost any legal
question which may arise from the "given" facts, if the facts are or
may be covered by an existing statute, rule or order. The contrary
would be true if the statute cannot be applied until the agency
adopts an implementing rule.32
(2) Is the agency limited to facts "given" to it by the petitioner, or may it develop additionalfacts or resolve disputed issues of fact? It has been argued in the officially published North
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act Manual that the agency
may give notice to additional parties if it decides that "additional
public participation would be required by the Act, . . . or would

aid the agency in making a decision." 3 3 Nevertheless, it is submitted that analysis of the applicable sections of the NCAPA will
demonstrate that the intention of the statute is to limit the agency
to the facts "given" by the petitioner and that no contribution to
the "given" facts by other parties is contemplated.
While section 150A-17 entitles a "person aggrieved" to have
his claim determined by a declaratory ruling, within the limits
stated above, the Act provides no machinery for settling disputed
issues of fact in such a proceeding. A declaratory ruling on the validity of a rule might itself be considered to be "rulemaking," since
a declaration of invalidity would obviously lead to the repeal of the
rule, and repeal is included within the definition of "rulemaking"
under section 150A-10, were it not for the fact that the same section expressly declares that a declaratory ruling is not a "rule."
Thus the provisions of section 150A-12 for a "public hearing" in
rulemaking do not apply. A declaratory ruling on the "applicability
to a given state of facts" of a statute, rule or order of the agency
might be considered to be an agency decision in a contested case,
were it not for the fact that section 150A-2(2) expressly declares
U.S. 199, 232 (1974).
32. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (statute authorizing the Bureau
of Indian Affairs to expend funds for the benefit, care and assistance of Indians
"throughout the United States" cannot lawfully be limited to Indians who live on
reservations without "the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress"). A North Carolina example of
mandatory rulemaking is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-11 (1978), which states that
each agency shall "adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available."
33. C. DAY, NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT MANUAL § 3.07
(1975) (published by Department of Administration, State of North Carolina).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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that "contested cases" do not include declaratory rulings. Since
section 150A-2(2) also provides that "'[c]ontested case' means any
agency proceeding, by whatever name called, wherein the legal
rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudicatory
hearing," it is apparent that any "proceeding" in which the law
gives a right to an "adjudicatory hearing" or trial must be a "contested case" and cannot be one leading to a declaratory ruling. A
party is entitled by law to an adjudicatory hearing when a claim of
right or even of an "expectancy" will be determined on contested
facts.34 Since a "person aggrieved" under section 150A-17 would in
most instances have such a claim, adjudication must be via a "contested case" if the facts were disputed and via a declaratory ruling
only if they were undisputed or "given." This conclusion clearly
comports with the summary nature of the proceeding contemplated by section 150A-17, which the agency is obligated by statute
to complete within sixty days of the request for ruling.
Thus the remedy under section 150A-17 is much more limited
than the remedy available in a suit for declaratory judgment. In
the latter case a party is entitled by the Declaratory Judgment Act
to a trial on issues of disputed fact, as a prelude to the court's
declaration of the rights of the parties.3 5 A plaintiff may therefore
file a suit for declaratory judgment based on his own version of the
facts, leaving the defendants to develop opposing or additional
facts if they see fit. On the other hand, a petitioner for a declara34. In Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908), a proceeding
involving the levying of a tax by a board of equalization, the Supreme Court said
that "due process of law requires that. . . the taxpayer shall have an opportunity
to be heard" and that "a hearing in its very essence demands that he who is
entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however
brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972), held that an "expectancy" of continued employment after a one-year
contract was a sufficient property interest to entitle a teacher to an adjudicatory
hearing before his discharge. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), held that suspension from school for ten days must be preceded by a summary fact-finding hearing on the alleged grounds. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n., 290 N.C. 473, 226 S.E.2d 340 (1976), and Darnell v.
North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 30 N.C. App. 328, 226 S.E.2d 879 (1976), are
distinguishable because in each case the terminated employment was found to
create no expectancy, and therefore the law did not require a hearing or entitle
the discharged employee to judicial review under 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1331, §
2, as amended by 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 69, § 4.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-261 (1969).
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tory ruling by an agency must be sure that his presentation of the
facts is complete and accurate as to all relevant facts, both
favorable and unfavorable, otherwise the ruling will give him little
or no protection. If relevant facts are omitted or misstated, the ruling would clearly not be "binding" on the agency when applied to
the true facts. If counsel is in doubt as to whether he has obtained
from his investigation a complete and accurate statement of the
relevant facts, he will probably be well advised not to seek a declaratory ruling until the facts are clarified, or even to await action
by the agency in a "contested case."
(3) Must the "given state of facts" be sufficiently concrete to
authorize a court to render a declaratory judgment on them, or
may they be hypothetical? The problem is a difficult one. Arguments of practical convenience pull both ways. Persons subject to
agency jurisdiction would certainly find it convenient to be able to
submit to the agency a contemplated transaction and to obtain advice on the law concerning it. On the other hand, the mandatory
provisions of section 150A-17 might then cause the agency to be
inundated with requests which it would be obligated to act on,
even though the law might not yet be settled and the petitioners
might be testing the agency to see how far they could go without
being subject to governmental sanctions. The limited time of
agency personnel should be reserved for live controversies involving substantial urgency.
The language of the Act does not definitively settle the question. There is certainly no explicit requirement in section 150A-17
that a question presented for declaratory ruling on a "given state
of facts" must be justiciable. Agencies often do give informal advice on hypothetical facts submitted by an inquirer, and there is
some authority from other states that statutes authorizing (but not
requiring) declaratory rulings by agencies include rulings on such
"facts." 3 6 The exclusion of declaratory rulings from "contested
cases," which of course must be based on concrete facts, may imply
that there is no such limit in declaratory proceedings. The agencies
themselves appear to have accepted hypothetical facts as a proper
basis for declaratory rulings, since the rules adopted under section
36. Iowa is the only state found in which a court has expressly approved such
rulings. "Section 17A.9 [declaratory ruling section of the 1978 IOWA CODE ANN.]
contemplates declaratory rulings by administrative agencies on purely hypothetical sets of facts." City of Des Moines v. Public Emp. Rel. Bd., 275 N.W.2d 753,
758 (Iowa 1979).
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150A-17 do not distinguish hypothetical from actual facts. 7 It can
therefore be plausibly argued that both actual and hypothetical
facts are appropriate for declaratory rulings.
Nevertheless, the contrary arguments appear more persuasive.
These arguments are based on the unusual combination of requirements in section 150A-17 that the agency "shall" issue declaratory
rulings unless it makes a finding of good cause to the contrary, that
the ruling "is binding on the agency and on the person requesting
it" and may not be "retroactively" changed, that the ruling "is
subject to judicial review in the same manner as an agency final
decision in a contested case" and that, in case of the agency's failure to issue a ruling within sixty days of a request, both the "denial of the request" and "the merits of the request . . . shall be
subject to judicial review," i.e., the court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the facts presented to the agency.
No other administrative procedure act has been found which combines so many provisions indicating that a declaratory ruling must
be based on facts ripe for judicial decision.
The requirement of section 150A-17 that the agency "shall"
issue a declaratory ruling, unless it finds good cause to the contrary, appears to be unique. Other statutes use "may" or other permissive language.38 Mandatory ruling on hypothetical facts, absent
a showing of necessity and probable irreparable injury, is uniformly denied. 39 The reasons seem obvious. With a limited budget,
37. See rules collected in Appendix B infra.
38. A survey under the author's direction of the statutes of all states disclosed that only New Mexico's declaratory ruling section contained mandatory
language. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-9 (1979) states that each agency "shall" establish a system for declaratory rulings and that "such rulings shall be issued upon
petition by one whose interests, rights or privileges are immediately at stake, except when the agency for good cause finds issuance of such a ruling undesirable."
However, the force of the language quoted is substantially diminished by the facts
that the standing requirement clearly excludes hypothetical cases, and N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-8-8 (1979) gives jurisdiction to the state courts to issue declaratory
judgments on "the validity or applicability of a rule" without exhausting the
agency remedy.
39. U.S.: 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1976) provides that an agency "in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate controversy or remove
uncertainty."
Model State Administrative Procedure Act: 13 U.L.A. § 8 (Supp. 1979) states:
"Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings." The draftsmen of the Revised Model Act gave careful consideration to "the suggestion that agencies be required to furnish declaratory rulings" and concluded that "this proposal went too far" and that agencies
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an agency cannot reasonably be subjected to unlimited claims for
rulings on situations that may or may not arise, absent an unavoidable dilemma which presents a substantial likelihood of irreparable
injury if the ruling is not obtained.
Section 150A-17 makes every declaratory ruling "binding on
the agency and on the person requesting it unless it is altered or
set aside by the court" and provides that the agency may not "retroactively" change it. Such a provision might appropriately be
adopted as a matter of policy when an agency gives advice and the
recipient of the advice relies on it to his detriment, although similar policies have given the federal agencies considerable trouble. 0
It is inappropriate as part of a statute which would compel a binding ruling on hypothetical facts. As pointed out below, a ruling on
such facts would probably not be subject to judicial review, and
thus the agency might be locked into taking a definitive position
on a question which it had not had a full opportunity to consider,
would be permitted to decline to resolve any particular question. 1 F. COOPER,
supra note 1, at 242-43.
State Administrative Procedure Acts: With the exception of New Mexico (see
supra note 38), all such state statutes are in substantially one of the following
forms: (1) Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-705 (1976) (substantial adoption of the
Model Act), (2) Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-176 (West Supp. 1979)
(each agency "may, in its discretion, issue declaratory rulings"), (3) Illinois: ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 1009 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (each agency "may in its
discretion provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for
declaratory rulings"), (4) Maine: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 9001 (1979) ("an agency
may make an advisory ruling" and "shall prescribe by rule . . . the procedure"),
(5) Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art 41, § 250 (1978) ("any agency may issue a declaratory ruling" and "shall prescribe by rule" the form for petitions and the procedure). 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 31, § 4.10 at 276, states that, from the agencies'
point of view, any requirement that they rule on the merits of every proper petition would be "unthinkable."
40. Statutory enactments protecting parties who rely in good faith on advisory opinions from federal agencies involve the "grave risk" that agencies will
simply stop issuing such opinions. Such a change occurred in the Wage Hour and
Public Contracts Division of the Department of Labor after enactment of 29
U.S.C. § 259 (1976). 1 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 245. In 1962, the Federal Trade
Commission adopted rules making advisory opinions binding (16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 - .4
(1977)). Its report of that year described the response as "overwhelming"; but in
later years the number of advisory opinions declined to almost zero, and in 1971,
the practice of reporting them was discontinued. The 1967 F.T.C. ADMINISTRATIVE
MANUAL ch. 6-132, threw many safeguards around the giving of advice. There was
a controversy concerning the binding effect of advice given to Cowles Communications, Inc., M. AzIMow, supra note 1, at § 8.11. See Dixon, Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinions, 18 AD. LAW REV. 65 (1965).
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which might often be erroneous in the light of future real controversies, which might affect persons not before the agency and
which would be binding on the petitioner and the agency in subsequent judicial proceedings. Furthermore, since there is no requirement that the person obtaining such a ruling must rely on it in
order to make it binding, it would be quite possible to submit a
series of hypothetical fact statements for rulings, and yet the person requesting them could act only on the one deemed most advantageous to him. An interpretation of the statute permitting
such a result would impose an intolerable burden on the agency.
The most reasonable interpretation of the statute, therefore, is one
that would confine declaratory rulings to judicially reviewable
facts.
The provision of section 150A-17 dealing with the reviewability of declaratory rulings makes all such rulings subject to judicial
review "in the same manner as an agency final decision or order in
a contested case." This is an additional reason why such rulings
should be justiciable and not merely advisory opinions. The North
Carolina courts refuse to give advisory opinions and the position of
the federal courts is the same. 41 This position, based on constitutional grounds, does not exclude judicial ruling on facts which are
either existing or certain to arise in the future, provided that the
facts are concrete and adversary interests are represented. It does
exclude a judicial ruling on a legal question arising from facts not
yet in being and subject to contingencies, unless the person seeking
the ruling can show that he has gone as far as he can go without
irreparable injury and that the relevant facts presented to the
court are sufficiently concrete so that the court's ruling will dispose
of the issue presented. For example, a declaratory ruling on a license not yet applied for or a contract not yet signed could not
appropriately be issued by the agency because it could not be judicially reviewed. 42
This conclusion is reinforced by the power granted the court
in section 150A-17 to decide the merits of a request for declaratory
ruling if the agency fails to do so within sixty days. The court is
granted jurisdiction to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency in the absence of any decision by the latter. Since this judi41. See discussion infra III.G. Availability and Scope of Judicial Review.
42. North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 285 N.C. 434,
206 S.E.2d 178 (1974) (contract); Angell v. City of Raleigh, 267 N.C. 387, 148
S.E.2d 233 (1966) (license).
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cial power extends to all requests for agency rulings, subject only
to possible exclusion of certain classes of rulings for "good cause,"
it seems to follow that all such requests should present justiciable
controversies, and the statute should be so interpreted to preserve
its validity under the doctrine of separation of powers.
What are the practical consequences of these considerations?
On the one hand, the statute appears to require that agency declaratory rulings must be based on justiciable controversies. On the
other hand, agency rules and practice, so far as they have yet developed, indicate that the agencies will entertain requests for declaratory rulings on facts submitted by petitioners without distinguishing between justiciable and non-justiciable questions.4 8 In
these circumstances, the prospective petitioner faces a choice that
may be irreversible. Hence he should probably not file a petition
for a ruling unless either (a) he is certain that an adverse ruling
will give rise to a justiciable controversy so that he can obtain judicial review, or (b) he is willing to run the risk that an adverse ruling will be non-reviewable and binding on him until such time as
the agency may choose to change it voluntarily. Unless he fits one
or the other of those categories, he should seriously consider not
requesting a declaratory ruling. A better decision might be to reach
his own conclusion on the question involved or to request from the
agency informal advice which he could use as guidance but which
would not be binding on him or on the agency.
D.

STANDING OF PETITIONER BEFORE THE AGENCY AND THE COURTS

NCAPA 150A-17 permits a petition for a declaratory ruling by
an agency to be made by a "person aggrieved." Who is a "person
aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute must initially be determined by the agency but obviously presents a question of law
for ultimate determination by the court. Similar language in the
prior North Carolina statute has been given a broad interpretation,
so that the grievance need not be monetary."4 The present North
Carolina statute will presumably be similarly construed. A strong
sanction favoring hospitality in the granting of declaratory rulings
43. See Appendix B infra, Agency Rules Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17
(1978).
44. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963) (under 1973
N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1331, § 2, the Commissioner of Revenue is a "person aggrieved" entitled to judicial review, even though he has no personal interest in the
tax and tax law does not expressly give him a right of review).
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arises from the fact that failure to act causes the agency to lose its
jurisdiction to a reviewing court. This should enable any interested
petitioner to secure a declaratory ruling whenever the agency can
reasonably give one.
A more serious problem is presented by standing before the
court to question an agency's declaratory ruling after its issuance.
Unlike standing before the agency, standing before the court may
be of constitutional dimension. NCAPA 150A-43, applicable to
both contested cases and declaratory rulings, gives a right of review to "any person who is aggrieved." The words seem to mean
that such a person need not have been the petitioner before the
agency but may be anyone "aggrieved" by the precedential effect
of the ruling. Such has been the interpretation of the words "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute" in the judicial review provisions of the Federal APA. 45 However, the state and federal constitutions require
that the grievance of a plaintiff be personal, actual and concrete,
not hypothetical, remote or common to the public at large. 46 It is
difficult to see how a person could be "aggrieved" in this sense by
hypothetical facts which are neither in existence nor imminently
threatened. Thus the constitutional standing requirement reinforces the conclusion stated above that the subject matter contemplated by both sections 150A-17 and 150A-43 must be such as to
present a concrete and existing controversy.4 7 Unless the petitioner
before the agency is willing to abide by its decision, however erroneous, he would do well to assure himself before he files his petition that he has statutory and constitutional standing sufficient to
45. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). In Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S.
40 (1956), petitioner was entitled to judicial review of declaratory order of the
I.C.C. even though it was not a party to the proceeding before the Commission,
where the Commission's order gave notice that its operations might be unlawful.
46. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (a general interest in protecting the environment is not sufficient injury in fact to give standing to enjoin alleged illegal building, but allegation of prior use of the area by the Club's members would be sufficient); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (biology
teacher had standing to challenge a state statute forbidding the teaching of the
doctrine of evolution); Pilot Title Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Bank, 11 N.C. App.
444, 181 S.E.2d 799 (1971) (a mere fear that a claim will be asserted is not enough
to justify a declaratory judgment, but the court has jurisdiction where a claim has
been made and the court is convinced that litigation, sooner or later, is
unavoidable).
47. As to the elements of such a controversy, see infra III.G. Availability and
Scope of Judicial Review.
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entitle him to judicial review.
E.

IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES RULINGS SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE

ISSUED

In the light of the foregoing discussion of the primary jurisdiction of the agency, the obligation to exhaust administrative remedies, the appropriate subject matter of declaratory rulings and the
requirement of standing to obtain a ruling, we may now attempt a
discussion of when a declaratory ruling may lawfully and appropri-

ately be issued or denied.
NCAPA section 150A-17 states: "On request of a person aggrieved, an agency shall issue a declaratory ruling . . . except
where the agency for good cause finds issuance of a ruling undesir-

able. The agency shall prescribe in its rules the circumstances in
which rulings shall or shall not be issued" (emphasis added). This
provision is a rather clear directive that "good cause" shall be formulated by the agency so far as practicable in rules particularizing
the circumstances which the agency considers controlling in granting or denying requests. We may justly conclude that the draftsmen of this language were seeking to put all petitioners on notice
of the agency's grounds for issuance or refusal of rulings and to
require that petitioners' denied rulings be treated in a consistent
manner. It also seems likely that the agency has been granted
broad discretion to particularize the "circumstances" making rulings "undesirable."
Most of the rules adopted by the agencies up to the present
time do not carry out this statutory mandate in any complete or

consistent way. Some contain no statement of the relevant "circumstances" beyond the language of the statute. Others specify
only circumstances bearing on the issuance of a ruling on the validity of a rule. The rules of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board

cover the circumstances bearing on the denial of a ruling on the
validity of a rule or the denial of a ruling on the applicability of a
statute or rule to a given state of facts but do not deal with denial
of a ruling on the applicability of a previous order of the agency.
It is submitted that those agencies which have adopted rules
under section 150A-17 merely repeating the language of the statute, or dealing with only one of the statutory grounds for issuance
of a declaratory ruling, have not obeyed the legislative command.
Such failure might be attacked by filing a petition under NCAPA
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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105A-16 requesting the agency to adopt legally sufficient rules."
Another approach would be to contest the denial of any declaratory ruling on the ground that, until the agency had adopted legal
rules, it had no power to refuse to issue a ruling on any petition.
Since the court on review could decide both the validity of the denial and the merits of the petition, this approach should bring relief, although it might involve repeated appearances before the
agency and the courts.
Even those rules which do evidence an attempt to comply with
the statutory mandate to "prescribe . . . the circumstances in
which rulings shall or shall not be issued" do not do so in any complete or satisfactory way. The rules of the North Carolina Board of
Architecture go as far as any in this direction."9 They state the
following reasons which will "ordinarily" cause the Board to refuse
a declaratory ruling on the statutory subjects: (1) Validity of a
rule-failure of petitioner to show such change of circumstances
since the adoption of the rule that a ruling would be warranted, or
to show that factors specified in the request were not given full
consideration at the time the rule was issued; or where the "factual
content" in the request was specifically considered when the rule
was adopted. (2) Applicability of a statute, rule or order to given
facts-where there has been a "similar controlling factual determination in a contested case," or where "the subject matter of the
request is involved in pending litigation." The Board's rules require it to notify the petitioner of its refusal, "stating the reasons
for the denial of the declaratory ruling," which presumably will include specific reference to one of the specified grounds and citation
to any prior controlling decision. How the petitioner is to find out
what facts or factors were previously considered by the agency at
the time of adoptionof a rule, or whether given facts are similar to
those presented in an unpublished contested case or pending litigation, so that he can properly prepare his petition, is nowhere explained and is not readily apparent. No attempt is made to "prescribe. . . the circumstances in which rulings shall . . . be issued,"
except as they may be inferred from the reasons for refusal. Nor is
any attempt made to deal with the troublesome problems of the
appropriate subject matter for declaratory rulings which have been
48. See infra, IV. Petitions for Promulgation, Amendment or Repeal of
Rules.
49. See Appendix B infra, Rules of the North Carolina Board of Architecture, Rule .0503(d).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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discussed above.
Adoption of uniform rules specifying "the circumstances in
which rulings shall or shall not be issued" would seem appropriate
and practical, and should be undertaken by the Attorney General
or under his supervision. In view of the wide discretion given the
agencies to refuse rulings when they are found for good cause to be
"undesirable," many of the defects in NCAPA section 150A-17
could be corrected by agency rules specifying the relevant "circumstances." The rules should at least cover the following points which
are presently not covered in any of the rules examined:
(1) Encouragement of informal advice. Since the North Carolina Administrative Code has not yet been published and distributed, and declaratory rulings will not be published until they are
appealed to the Courts of Appeal, it is quite probable that an
agency will have already adopted a relevant rule or issued a relevant decision of which a petitioner will know nothing. If the rules
were to provide for a preliminary sifting of all inquiries, formal and
informal, and all petitions for declaratory rulings, to determine
whether the question submitted was already covered, the time of
both the agency and the petitioner would be saved. The rules could
then provide for written notice to the petitioner (oral notice is too
susceptible to misunderstanding) that the agency considered a
specified rule or decision, set forth in the notice, to be an answer to
his inquiry. If the petitioner then believed that his question was
not covered by the particular rule or decision, or that the rule or
decision was invalid, he could present a better drafted petition for
declaratory ruling. Such a rule should specifically designate by title
the person or persons within the agency who would deal with all
such inquiries so that the time of both the inquirer and the agency
might be saved. In many cases, the answer to this preliminary inquiry might dispose of it satisfactorily to the inquirer so that no
petition for declaratory ruling would need to be filed.
(2) Determination of what "given state of facts" is acceptable for declaratory ruling. The major omission in both NCAPA
section 150A-17 and the agency rules adopted pursuant to it is the
failure to take a position on what "facts" are appropriate for declaratory rulings. The agency certainly has strong reasons for conservation of its time by limiting petitions to those based on concrete facts, either actual or imminent, which could be the subject
of a declaratory judgment by a court. For the reasons set forth
above, it is believed that such a limitation would be a correct interpretation of section 150A-17, and particularly of its provision for
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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judicial review. In any event, the rulemaking power of the agency
under section 150A-17 seems broad enough to enable it to find
"undesirable" and reject any petition not stating "facts" ripe for
judicial review, whether or not the section would be so limited in
the absence of a rule.
(3) Whether the facts "given" in the petition can be amplified or modified by the agency or by other interested persons. All
of the agency rules examined except those of the Board of Alcoholic Control assume, without stating, that the "facts" set forth in
the petition for declaratory ruling shall be the sole "facts" considered by the agency.5 0 For the reasons elaborated in the prior sections of this article, it is submitted that the "given state of facts" is
limited by statute to those stated in the petition, without contradiction or elaboration. The agency rules should so state and should
probably also contain a warning that the "binding" effect of the
ruling is dependent on an accurate statement in the petition of all
relevant facts, favorable and unfavorable. If the agency knows facts
contradicting those in the petition, it may call them to the attention of the petitioner, with the suggestion that the petition be
amended to include them, upon pain of dismissal in case of refusal.
However, the agency may choose to construe section 150A-17, in
accordance with the North CarolinaAdministrative ProcedureAct
Manual, as allowing the bringing in of additional parties. In that
event, the additional parties would obviously not be bound by the
petitioner's statement of facts, and the rules should allow them all
the rights of a due process hearing, including confrontation, crossexamination and production of contrary evidence, on a timetable
which would permit the prompt agency decision contemplated by
section 150A-17. The courts could then decide whether such an adversary procedure is allowable under the section.
(4) Mandatory requirement of findings or reasons in support of a declaratory ruling. None of the rules compel the agency
to state findings or reasons in support of its ruling, although the
courts uniformly hold that such explanation of an agency decision
is essential for meaningful judicial review.5 1 The only rules which
50. See Appendix B infra, Rules of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.
Rules .0403, .0405 and .0409 require that the request list names and addresses of
third parties "who may possibly be affected," provide for notice to such parties
and authorize third parties to present "written comments and oral arguments."
However, the rules make no provision for an adjudicatory hearing.
51. U.S.: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), rev'd, 332 U.S. 194 (1947); cf. 5
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even mention reasons are those of the Board of Alcoholic Control,
and they are limited to a provision that the record for review shall
include any reasons which the agency may choose to give for the
decision. 2 It is true that section 150A-17 specifies that a declaratory ruling is subject to judicial review "in the same manner as an
agency final decision or order in a contested case"; but this does
not cover the point, because the requirement of findings is contained only in the contested case hearing sections," and section
150A-2(2) provides that contested cases do not include declaratory
rulings. Thus the procedural requirements for hearings in contested cases do not apply to the simplified procedure contemplated
for declaratory rulings. The matter could readily be clarified by a
rule specifically requiring the agency to give findings or reasons in
support of its ruling. Such findings or reasons can, of course, be
informal, so long as they are sufficiently clear to enable the petitioner and the reviewing court to understand the ruling.
F.

BINDING EFFECT OF DECLARATORY RULINGS

NCAPA 150A-17 states: "A declaratory ruling is binding on
the agency and the person requesting it unless it is altered or set
aside by the court. An agency may not retroactively change a declaratory ruling, but nothing in this section prevents an agency
from prospectively changing a declaratory ruling." These provisions require answers to some fundamental questions: (1) How
"binding" can a ruling be if persons adversely interested are not
made parties to the declaratory proceeding before the agency? (2)
Does the "binding" effect of the ruling on the petitioner and the
agency protect the petitioner if the agency exceeds its delegated
powers? (3) Where is the line to be drawn between retroactive
change and prospective change of a declaratory ruling?
On the first point, the petitioner is faced with the fact that
section 150A-17 does not in terms provide for bringing in persons
who may be adverse to the petitioner and therefore does not reU.S.C. § 557(c) (1976). See generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
16.02 (1958).
N.C.: In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 253 S.E.2d 912 (1979); Taylor v. Dixon, 251
N.C. 304, 111 S.E.2d 181 (1959). See generally 2 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 471.

Cf. N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 105A-36 (1978).
52. See Appendix B infra, Rules of the North Carolina Board of Alcoholic
Control, Rule .0412.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-23 to -37 (1978). The requirement of findings is
contained in sections 150A-34 and 150A-36.
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quire the type of adversary proceeding before the agency which the
courts consider essential to a justiciable controversy. In the absence of procedures affording to such persons notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard, they are obviously not
bound by the agency ruling. If their first opportunity to be heard is
at the judicial review stage, the court may be faced with the choice
of refusing to grant judicial review because of the absence of indispensable parties or opening the proceedings to a judicial trial at
which these persons can be brought in and allowed to contest all
disputed issues of fact and law. Neither alternative is contemplated by the NCAPA. Whether either is available to the court will
be considered below in Section G where judicial review is
considered.
On the second question, involving the "binding" effect of a declaratory ruling on the petitioner and the agency, we must start
with the language of section 150A-17. The section declares that the
ruling is binding on "the agency and the person requesting it unless it.is altered or set aside by the court." Whatever might be the
conclusion in the absence of such language, the section seems clear
that the ruling is binding on "the agency" and not on the government as a whole and that it is binding on both the agency and the
petitioner unless set aside in the direct review proceeding which
the section provides. Thus the agency cannot make a determination of its own powers which would be conclusive on another
agency of the state government. Can the agency, by issuing a ruling extending its delegated powers, or declaring the law contrary to
an express legislative prohibition, estop itself from retroactively
correcting its error to conform to the law? The proposition might
be maintainable if the petitioner had relied on the ruling to his
detriment, but the statute does not require reliance." It seems inconceivable that the legislature could have intended to grant to an
agency the power to amend the statutes by fiat to favor a petitioner and to protect the favored petitioner indefinitely against
compliance with the law simply because he did not seek judicial
review and the agency did not change the ruling. Yet such would
be the consequence of holding every ruling to be "binding." It is
54. North Carolina cases hold that the government cannot be estopped in the
exercise of a governmental function, even where a person has relied on the erroneous advice. See cases supra note 8. Even those authors who argue that the government should be subject to estoppel where persons have relied on erroneous advice
or rulings do not contend that estoppel should apply in the absence of reliance.
M. AziMow, supra note 1, at § 3.14; 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 31, at ch. 17.
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submitted that incorrect rulings can be "binding" only when they
are within the powers delegated to the agency and are at worst
erroneous exercises of granted powers or abuses of discretion
within granted powers. Any decision beyond or contrary to the
agency's statutory authority cannot be a "ruling" within the meaning of section 150A-17 and thus cannot be binding on, or a protection to, the agency or the petitioner.
The third question, involving the line to be drawn between
forbidden retroactive change and permitted prospective change of
a declaratory ruling, involves a fundamental distinction between
agencies and courts. Most court proceedings terminate with a final
judgment based on past facts. Agencies, however, are normally engaged in an ongoing program of administration or regulation, involving a substantial amount of discretion, in which they must be
free to reach new conclusions within the limits of their discretion,
even though the governing statute and the agency rules have-not
changed. Thus, for example, long-term plans made on the basis of
a declaratory ruling would not prevent the agency from prospectively changing its ruling, even though the action planned still had
a long time to run. Any legal relationships entered into on the basis of an agency declaratory ruling would necessarily be subject to
alteration by lawful regulatory change.
The necessary conclusion appears to be that the "binding"
provision should be read to state no more than it expressly says. It
cannot be binding on persons not before the agency, including
other agencies of the government and other persons. It is binding
unless set aside in some direct review proceeding, provided that it
is within the agency's delegated powers. The binding effect is limited to matters actually considered and decided, and thus any material variation in the facts on which the issues were decided would
be outside the binding effect. The agency retains the right to
change the ruling prospectively, even though it might upset ongoing legal relationships based upon the former ruling. Finally, in
view of the great importance of presenting to the agency all issues
which the petitioner wants to raise, and of giving to the agency a
complete and accurate statement of the relevant facts, the petition
for a declaratory ruling and the subsequent proceedings before the
agency should clearly be'handled by an attorney.
G.

AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Our consideration of judicial review starts with the paradox
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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that a declaratory ruling under NCAPA is not a "contested case," 55
and yet it is "subject to judicial review in the same manner as an
agency final decision in a contested case."'56 We are therefore

forced to a consideration of whether the two proceedings are in
fact sufficiently similar so that the same review procedure can be
made applicable to them, or whether they differ in ways so fundamental that judicial review "in the same manner" cannot be had.
The scanty legislative history gives us no aid in the solution of this
problem.
The exclusion of declaratory rulings from the definition of
"contested case" suggests that the draftsmen may not have intended to require that a petition for such a ruling must necessarily
present a justiciable controversy, in spite of the provision of section 150A-17 purporting to make such rulings subject to judicial
review. It may be that the provision for review of a declaratory
ruling "in the same manner as" the final order in a contested case
means only that, if a declaratory proceeding does present a justiciable controversy, it shall be subject to the same form of judicial
review. While we have contended above that section 150A-17
should be interpreted to require the subject of a declaratory ruling
to be justiciable, we have also recognized that agency practice embodied in present agency rules apparently permits the submission
of purely hypothetical facts for a declaratory ruling and establishes
no procedure for the resolution of disputed issues of fact.5 7 On the
other hand, a "contested case" is defined as a proceeding "wherein
the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law
to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing." 8 Obviously such a proceeding does present an ac55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1978).
56. Id. § 150A-17; see also id. § 150A-48.
57. See Appendix B infra for collection of rules. It may be a misnomer to
speak of "agency practice" since most of the agencies questioned had received no
petitions for declaratory rulings. Their constituency has continued to make informal inquiries as it did before the NCAPA was adopted.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1978). The cases in other states, decided
under statutory provisions resembling sections 150A-2(2), -17 and -43, are divided
on the question of whether a declaratory ruling by an agency on hypothetical
facts is judicially reviewable. Iowa appears to be the only state in which courts
have said that such a decision is judicially reviewable, but the facts of the case
before the court probably presented an actual controversy susceptible of declaratory judgment. City of Des Moines v. Public Emp. Rel. Bd., 275 N.W.2d 753
(Iowa 1979). But see Sarasota County v. Department of Adm'n, 350 So. 2d 802
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1978) (county which
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tual justiciable controversy.
The statutory exclusion of the declaratory proceeding from
"contested case" applies to procedure as well as substance. Section
150A-17 adopts only the procedure for judicial review of contested
cases, and thus the procedure before the agency in contested cases
is inapplicable. It seems reasonable to assume that the draftsmen
of the Act sought to make the declaratory proceeding speedy, informal and free from the statutory safeguards which turn the "contested case" into the equivalent of a judicial trial. The rights
granted by the NCAPA to the parties in a' "contested case" before
the agency include the right to an adjudicatory hearing, 9 the right
to become a party to a case whenever a person claims an interest in
the subject matter and may be impeded in the protection of that
interest,6 0 the right to present evidence and to cross-examine opposing witnesses,6 1 the right to have all evidence made a part of
the record,62 the right of subpoena," the right to receive proposed
findings of fact and file exceptions to them" ead the right to a
final decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law "based
exclusively on the evidence and on matters officially noticed."" As
previously shown, the declaratory ruling is based on the allegations
of the petition, with no requirement that adverse interests be represented or that the alleged facts be tested by normal trial
procedures.
If the correct interpretation of section 150A-17 is that it governs only the procedure for judicial review, and does not necessarily require such review, then the courts have the right to reject
any petition for review that does not present a justiciable case. On
would not have standing to initiate an administrative proceeding for relief cannot
obtain judicial review of a declaratory statement on the subject); Gretna Pub.
School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268 (1978) (proceeding to obtain a declaratory ruling is not a "contested case" and therefore not subject to judicial review); Board of School Dirs. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n., 42
Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969) (declaratory ruling by Board in answer to
hypothetical question concerning duty of municipal employer is not subject to
judicial review, since the court will not render an advisory opinion).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-23(a) (1978).
60. Id. § 150A-23(d) (incorporating Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
id. ch. 1A (1969)).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-25 (1978).
62. Id. § 150A-37.
63. Id. § 150A-27.
64. Id. § 150A-34.
65. Id. § 150A-36.
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the other hand, if section 150A-17 intends to require the courts to
review all declaratory rulings, even those based on hypothetical
facts and without the presence of indispensable adverse parties, it
may represent an invalid attempt by the legislative branch to expand the "judicial power" granted by Article IV, Section 1, of the
state constitution to the North Carolina courts. Whichever view is
adopted, a brief consideration of the extent of judicial power under
the state constitution is necessary.
There appears to be no substantial difference between the
concept of a justiciable case under the "judicial power" grant in
the federal constitution and under the "judicial power" grant in
the North Carolina Constitution." Each requires the presence of
the following elements of a case in order to give the court
jurisdiction:
(1) A legal issue. There must be "law to apply," to use the
graphic expression of the United States Supreme Court in reviewing a federal agency decision. 7 In other words, the issue must not
be one which is reserved to the exclusive judgment of the legislative, executive or administrative authorities of the government. An
agency ruling on a matter wholly "committed to agency discretion"
does not present an issue which the court can decide under either
federal or North Carolina law. 8
66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."

N.C. CONST., art. IV, § 1:
The Judicial power of the State shall, except as provided in Section
3 of this Article [relating to administrative agencies], be vested in a
Court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a General Court of Justice.
The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a
co-ordinate department of the government.
On the elements of a case or controversy within the federal judicial power,
see Dickson, DeclaratoryRemedies and Constitutional Change, 24 VAND. L. REV.
257 (1971).
67. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971)
("Plainly, there is 'law to apply' and thus the exemption for action 'committed to
agency discretion' is inapplicable." The court then held disbursement of funds by
the Secretary of Transportation to be subject to judicial review).
68. U.S.: Federal APA review provisions do not authorize review of agency
action "committed to agency discretion" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2) (1976). Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (challenge to Army's surveillance of civilian political activity did not present a case for the courts); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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(2) Ripeness for judicial decision. The facts must be actual
and concrete, not remote or hypothetical. A decision on remote or
hypothetical "facts" would represent mere "advice," which neither
the federal nor the state courts have power to give.9 If section
150A-17 should be construed to permit agency declaratory rulings
on "validity of a rule" as an abstract question, or on "given" facts
which are not actual and concrete, it seems clear that such rulings
would not be judicially reviewable, and the North Carolina courts
have so held in declining to review such agency decisions.7
Board has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute unfair labor practice proceedings); United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordmen, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967) (the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute unfair labor
practice proceedings).
N.C.: The right of review granted by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978) in a
"contested case" is limited by the definition of "contested case" in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1978) to a proceeding wherein the "legal rights, duties or privileges of a party" are determined. Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 290 N.C.
473, 226 S.E.2d 340 (1976) (similar language in 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1331, §
2), did not permit review of the discharge of a state employee in the absence of
violation of a constitutional right.
69. U.S.: Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (the "basic
rationale of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the courts . . . from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements"); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 240-41 (1937) ("The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests").
N.C.: Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Econ. Resources, 295 N.C.
683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978) (contention that the Coastal Area Management Act
and regulations invalidly authorized warrantless searches was not before the court
where no search had occurred or was threatened); North Carolina Consumers
Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 285 N.C. 434, 206 S.E.2d 178 (1974) (declaratory
judgment as to the validity of a proposed contract between plaintiffs and numerous municipalities will not be granted in absence of evidence that plaintiffs have
the power to bring the contract into being); Angell v. City of Raleigh, 267 N.C.
387, 148 S.E.2d 233 (1966) (declaratory judgment that city television licensing
ordinance is invalid will not be granted where no license has been issued under
the ordinance); Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 56 S.E.2d 404 (1949) (declaratory
judgment as to the marketability of a real estate title will not be granted where it
is not alleged that a prospective purchaser has been obtained, since the court is
not authorized to give advisory opinions); Town of Tryon v. Duke Power Co., 222
N.C. 200, 22 S.E.2d 450 (1942) (it is no part of the judicial power vested in courts
by the constitution to give an advisory opinion on a condemnation in the absence
of an allegation that action is contemplated).
70. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Econ. Resources, 295 N.C.
683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978) (designation of plaintiffs' land by the Coastal Resources Commission as an interim area of environmental concern, which might in
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(3) Adversary parties. There must be a plaintiff with standand a defendant with an opposing interest who is subject to
72
suit. A "person aggrieved" entitled to judicial review in a "contested case" must be one whose "legal rights, duties or privileges"
are determined.7 3 Section 150A-17 makes the same tests applicable
to one who seeks judicial review of a declaratory ruling. As the federal courts express it, there must be "injury in fact" to entitle a
plaintiff to standing, 4 which means that he must have an existing
ing 7 l

future result in denial of all applications for development permits, is not judicially
reviewable until the time for application for such permits arrived); Bragg Dev. Co.
v. Braxton, 239 N.C. 427, 79 S.E.2d 918 (1954) (notice given to plaintiff that its
property would be assessed for taxes, and agreement by the parties that the question of its exemption from taxes should be submitted to the court for decision,
present an "abstract question" which is not justiciable).
71. U.S.: Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974) (class action for declaration that members of Congress illegally held military commissions in violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, dismissed for lack of
standing because plaintiffs suffered "injury in the abstract"); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (an agency's general statement of policy is not judicially reviewable because it "does not have a
sufficiently immediate and significant impact upon petitioners").
N.C.: Angell v. City of Raleigh, 267 N.C. 387, 389-90, 148 S.E.2d 233, 234-35
(1966) (court stated that "the inherent function of judicial tribunals is to adjudicate genuine controversies between antagonistic litigants with respect to their
rights, status, or other legal relations" and that there must be "an actual or real
existing controversy between parties having adverse interests," citing Lide v.
Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 118, 56 S.E.2d 404, 410 (1949)).
72. The state is immune to suit except where it has consented to be sued.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168, 118 S.E.2d 792 (1961). 1973 N.C. Sess.
Laws ch. 1331, § 2, authorizing judicial review of a final administrative decision,
was held consent to suit in a case coming within its provisions. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Lentz, 31 N.C. App. 88, 228 S.E.2d 533 (1976). Consent to suit has
also been implied when the state enters into a contract. Smith v. State, 289 N.C.
303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976). The Declaratory Judgment Act has been held to grant
jurisdiction for judicial review of a suit attacking the constitutionality of a statute. Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978) (granting right to judicial review to a
"person who is aggrieved by a final agency decision in a contested case"); id. §
150A-2(6) (defining "person aggrieved" as one "directly or indirectly affected substantially in their person, property or public office or employment by an agency
decision"); id. § 150A-2(2) (defining "contested case" as an "agency proceeding
. . . whereii the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to
be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing"). It
is apparent that the statutory right to judicial review requires that all three sections be satisfied.
74. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (conservation organization
seeking to enjoin proposed development of wilderness area, but not alleging that
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interest which is harmed or threatened with harm. One who poses
to the agency a purely hypothetical question would obviously not
meet this test. So far as the defendant is concerned, an agency
seeking to sustain its declaratory ruling would meet the requirement of an opposing interest.7 5 The right granted by section 150A17 to judicial review of an agency declaratory ruling would constitute a sufficient statutory waiver of the agency's sovereign immunity so as to make it subject to suit.7
(4) Resolution of the controversy by judicial decision. In a
sense, this requirement is merely the summation of the preceding
three, but it serves to emphasize that the court must be able to
enter a judgment which is subject only to review by a higher court,
and not to the discretion of any other branch of the government.
The courts have recognized this requirement.7 It would not be
met, for example, by appeal from an agency ruling which merely
it or its members used the area for any purpose, failed to allege "injury in fact"
sufficient for standing); Association of Data Proc. Serv. Org'ns, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970) (plaintiff must allege "injury in fact, economic or otherwise").
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(6) (1978) ("Person aggrieved" includes any person or persons "affected substantially in their ...

public decision, was held con-

sent to suit in a case coming within its provisions"); In re Halifax Paper Co., 259
N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963) (under 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1331, § 2, a
"person aggrieved," entitled to review of an agency decision, included a public
official suffering loss only in his official capacity). It follows a fortiori that an
agency defending its declaratory ruling would have sufficient interest to be a
party respondent on judicial review.
76. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Lentz, 31 N.C. App. 88, 228 S.E.2d 533
(1976).
77. U.S.: Chicago S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948) (the court had no power to review the action of the Civil Aeronautics
Board in granting an overseas route, in spite of a statute vesting such power of
review in the court, where the Board's decision was subject to reversal or modification by the President); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)
("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion").
N.C.: Bragg Dev. Co. v. Braxton, 239 N.C. 427, 79 S.E.2d 918 (1950) (where
the parties submitted to the court a question of the legality of a tax not yet levied, the case was dismissed because "no justiciable question on which the court, in
a civil action, could render a judgment is disclosed" and any judgment "would be
wholly advisory in nature"); Tryon v. Duke Power Co., 222 N.C. 200, 206 S.E.2d
178 (1942) (question as to whether plaintiff town had the right to condemn defendant's property, in the absence of any allegation of intent to do so, does not present a controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, since the result would be
purely advisory).
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exercised unreviewable agency discretion, although a court does
have power to order the agency to exercise a discretion which the
law requires rather than merely refusing to act.78
Lack of a justiciable controversy in the record coming up to
the reviewing court under section 150A-17 cannot be corrected by
trial in that court. As pointed out above, if the court were to hear
and determine anew a matter on which the agency had issued a
declaratory ruling (as distinguished from the agency's refusal to issue a ruling), the court would be violating the doctrine which
places primary jurisdiction in the agency over matters within its
jurisdiction. 79 The court would also be violating the provision of
section 150A-17 that there be "judicial review in the same manner"
as in a contested case, since in contested cases the reviewing court
"shall take no evidence not offered at the hearing" before the
agency.8 0 As pointed out above, in declaratory proceedings before
the agency, the only evidence "offered" should be the facts stated
in the petition, which are the exclusive basis for review.8 1 There is
thus no way by which evidence can be taken on review without
contradicting the provisions of the NCAPA.
Can the limitations of judicial review under the NCAPA be
overcome by some other judicial remedy available to the petitioner
under the law? Section 150A-43 authorizes such a remedy "to test
the validity of any administrative action not made reviewable
under this Article." The answer appears clearly negative. Insofar as
the record and ruling presented for review contain a justiciable
case, petition for review under the NCAPA is the exclusive method
of review by the clear terms of both sections 150A-17 and 150A-43.
It is true that the North Carolina courts have approved declaratory
78. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950) (court could order the U.S.
Attorney General to exercise the discretion granted him by statute as to the deportation or non-deportation of an alien, where he mistakenly assumed that the
statute required deportation, even though his ultimate decision was not judicially
reviewable).
79. See supra III.B. Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-50 (1978).
81. It is true that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-50 authorizes the court to "hear
...the matter de novo" where "no record was made of the administrative proceeding or the record is inadequate"; however, this provision obviously refers to a
situation where an agency trial was actually held but not recorded or not completely recorded. It is not applicable to a declaratory ruling proceeding where the
decision was made on the basis of the facts stated in the petition, and all the
matters before the agency are contained in the record on review.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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judgment or certiorari to review agency action not otherwise reviewable, but these remedies have been limited to justiciable controversies. 82 It seems inconceivable that the constitutional requirements for a justiciable controversy previously established under
the Declaratory Judgments Act and in review by certiorari should
be ignored in judicial review of declaratory rulings.
If we apply the foregoing considerations to NCAPA section
150A-17, we are left with the following possible alternative
interpretations:
(1) The section may be construed to authorize declaratory
rulings by the agency only on questions which will meet the requirements of a justiciable case if subsequently reviewed in the
courts. It is submitted that this interpretation is to be preferred,
for the reasons set forth at length above. This interpretation requires that a petition submitted for agency ruling must present a
legal issue, not an issue of unreviewable agency discretion; that the
facts "given" to the agency as a basis for decision must be ripe for
judicial review, not incomplete, remote, hypothetical or subject to
contest; that the adversary parties before the court must be either
confined to the petitioner and the agency, or, if other parties are
indispensable to the court's decision, that the other parties
brought in on review do not contest the completeness and accuracy
of the facts "given" to the agency and that the court must be able
to resolve the controversy by its judgment.
(2) The section may be construed to authorize declaratory
rulings by the agency on both justiciable and nonjusticiable questions but to require judicial review only of those rulings which
meet the requirements of a justiciable case. This is a possible interpretation, although it is believed to be an incorrect one. A major
difficulty with this interpretation is that it would apparently make
"binding" on the petitioner and the agency an erroneous ruling
which would not be judicially reviewable because it did not meet
one or more of the requirements of a justiciable case. The ruling
82. Bratcher v. Winters, 269 N.C. 636, 153 S.E.2d 375 (1967) (certiorari will
not lie to review the executive action of a chief of police in demoting a police
captain but will lie to review the quasi-judicial action of a civil service board in
removing him from the police department); In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 569,
131 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963) ("The writ of certiorari issues only to review the judicial or quasi-judicial action of an inferior tribunal, commission or officer"; held that it did not lie to review the refusal of a city
council to amend the zoning ordinance as it pertained to plaintiff's property, and
the writ would be dismissed).
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would remain "binding" until such time as the agency chose to set
it aside "prospectively," which might be never.
(3) The section may be construed to authorize declaratory
rulings by the agency on both justiciable and nonjusticiable questions, and to require the courts to grant review in all cases. It is
submitted that this interpretation is inadmissible. It would compel
the courts either to greatly expand the established definition of
"judicial power" or to declare the section in part unconstitutional
as legislative interference with the power or jurisdiction rightfully
pertaining to the judicial department in violation of Article IV,
Section 1, of the State Constitution.
The conclusion seems unavoidable that an attorney considering a request for declaratory ruling under NCAPA 150A-17 must
assume the risk of determining whether the record as it emerges
from the agency will present the elements of a justiciable case. If it
will not, his client as well as the agency will be "bound" without
the possibility of judicial review; and the only advantage gained by
petition for declaratory ruling, as compared to a request for informal advice, would be that petitioner would obtain a ruling which
the agency must follow until the agency sets it aside. It is questionable whether, in most cases, this advantage is worth the disadvantages which would result from an unfavorable ruling in a nonreviewable situation.

IV.

PETITIONS FOR PROMULGATION, AMENDMENT OR REPEAL OF
RULES

The preceding discussion has dealt with the means of seeking
agency guidance in situations where the petitioner believes that an
agency rule is invalid, or that a statute or rule does not apply to "a
given state of facts" which he presents to the agency. However,
situations may arise where no rule covers petitioner's situation, or
where the existing rule is unfavorable but is clearly authorized by
the relevant statute or where petitioner is willing to accept the
likelihood that the existing rule is authorized. In any of these situations, NCAPA section 150A-16 is applicable. The section says:

§ 150A-16. Petition for adoptionof rules.-Any person may petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, and may accompany his petition with such data,
views, and arguments as he thinks pertinent. Each agency shall
prescribe by rule the form for petitions and the procedure for
their submission, consideration, and disposition. Within 30 days
after submission of a petition, the agency either shall deny the
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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petition in writing (stating its reasons for the denial) or shall initiate rule-making proceedings in accordance with G.S. 150A-12
and G.S. 150A-13. Denial of the petition to initiate rule making
under this section shall be considered a final agency decision for
purposes of judicial review, which shall be limited to questions of
abuse of discretion.
This section is new to North Carolina, although a similar sec-

tion is contained in the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act."3
A petition under section 150A-16 may not appropriately ques-

tion the validity of an agency rule, since that subject is covered by
a petition for declaratory ruling under section 150A-17. A petition
under section 150A-16 is simply an appeal to the discretion of the
agency to promulgate a new rule or to amend or repeal an old one
which petitioner finds unsatisfactory. This reading of the section is
confirmed by the provision for appeal from a denial of the petition,
which is limited to "questions of abuse of discretion." The petition
under section 150A-16 will therefore be appropriate only where petitioner either has no remedy under section 150A-17 or where the
remedy under that section has been exhausted without a favorable
result.
Since a petition under section 150A-16 is an appeal to the
agency to exercise its discretion within its granted powers, it is apparent that the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies require that the remedy granted by that
section be pursued prior to invoking the jurisdiction of a court."
Action on the petition is not discretionary, because the agency is
required either to deny it or to initiate rulemaking proceedings
within thirty days. If the petition is granted, obviously the petitioner must await the outcome of the rulemaking proceedings
before seeking judicial review. If the petition is denied, the section
states that the denial "shall be considered a final agency decision
for purposes of judicial review."
The first question presented by section 150A-16 involves the
standing of petitioner before the agency and subsequently before
the court on review. The section provides that "any person" may
request the promulgation, amendment or repeal of a rule. If the
section is read literally, the petitioner need have no interest in the
subject of the petition, or solely a hypothetical interest. It is note83. 13 U.L.A. § 6 at 378 (Supp. 1979).
84. See discussion of primary jurisdiction under III.B., supra.
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worthy that section 150A-16, unlike section 150A-17, does not require the agency to issue a ruling or show "good cause" for refusal;.
the agency is permitted either to deny the petition or to initiate
rulemaking proceedings. It therefore seems likely that section
150A-16 is to be interpreted in accordance with its literal language
to permit "any person" to file a petition but also to permit the
agency in its discretion to deny the petition, provided only that it
state "its reasons for the denial," which might simply be that petitioner has insufficient interest in the subject matter. A petitioner
who was not actually "aggrieved" by the lack of a rule, or by the
form or substance of an existing rule, would seem to have no
standing to object in court to the agency's denial; and even if he
did have sufficient standing to entitle him to be heard, it would
seem improbable that he could convince the court that there had
been an "abuse of discretion." This interpretation of the section
harmonizes with its apparent purpose, to allow anyone to bring to
the agency's attention the possible need for promulgation, amendment or repeal of a rule-in the same way that anyone might ask
the legislature to adopt a statute-but to allow the agency broad
discretion to proceed or not to proceed.
If this interpretation of section 150A-16 is correct, then the
application of the judicial review provision of the section to an existing rule is a narrow one. Legislative rules are usually reviewable
only to determine whether (1) the rule is within the powers
granted to the agency by the legislature, (2) the rule was adopted
pursuant to proper procedure and (3) the rule is reasonable in the
sense of being the product of reason rather than an arbitrary act.86
These questions are not open to review under section 150A-16,
since all of them involve the validity of the rule, and the validity of
a rule is to be tested solely under section 150A-17. Consequently,
85. The following recent cases illustrate these criteria:
(1) Within the granted powers: State ex rel Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 294
N.C. 598, 242 S.E.2d 862 (1978) (Commission rule allowing reasonable costs of
exploration for gas to be recovered through rate increases held to be within its
power to compel adequate and efficient utility service);
(2) Adopted pursuant to proper procedure: Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of
Natural and Econ. Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978) (Coastal Resources Commission held to have adopted guidelines in accordance with agency
statute and rulemaking procedures of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-9 to -17 (1978);
(3) Reasonable rather than arbitrary:State ex rel Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 294 N.C. 598, 611-12, 242 S.E.2d 862, 870 (1978), (state economic regulation
"need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective" to
be valid).
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the only possible ground for attacking an existing rule would appear to be an appeal to the discretion of the agency to change it.
Changes in the law underlying the rule, or in the facts found or
assumed at the time it was adopted, which would make unreasonable a rule which was valid when adopted would not be sufficient,
since section 150A-17 has been correctly interpreted by the rules of
some of the agencies to cover precisely this situation."
The principal area within which section 150A-16 can operate
would appear to be the situation in which the agency must or
should adopt a rule but has failed to do so. Section 150A-17 does
not authorize a declaratory ruling on the lawfulness of the agency's
failure to adopt a rule, so section 150A-16 alone will govern. Agencies are required by NCAPA section 150A-11 to adopt rules of
practice, and failure to do so would clearly be an appropriate occasion for a petition under section 150A-16. Section 150A-17 says
that the agency "shall prescribe in its rules the circumstances in
which rulings shall or shall not be issued," and failure to do so
would also be an appropriate occasion for a petition under section
150A-16. Another occasion would be where an agency was authorized to make selective grants of funds for certain purposes but had
failed to adopt rules which would specify the grounds on which its
discretion would be exercised to prefer one applicant over another.87 Occasionally a statute will provide that it is not to become
effective until the agency charged with its enforcement adopts
rules implementing the statute, and here also the agency should
entertain a petition under section 150A-16 if it has not acted.8 8
86. See, e.g., Board of Medical Examiners Rule .0007, and Board of Architecture Rule .0503, in Appendix B, infra.
87. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (where statute directed the Bureau
of Indian Affairs to expend funds for the "benefit, care and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States," the court said that "the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc basis," but the Bureau must adopt rules
specifying whether benefits are limited to Indians living on the reservation or may
include Indians living on or near the reservation).
88. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (where the
Fair Labor Standards Act provided for exemption of employees "within the area
of production (as defined by the Administrator,) engaged in. . . canning of agricultural. . . commodities," the Administrator was directed by the court to adopt
a valid regulation to make the statute effective, even though the regulation had to
be applied retroactively); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) (where
state statute authorized state university to expel student for "misconduct" and
authorized the university to make rules, held that a student could not be expelled
under the statute until the university first adopted rules defining "misconduct").

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980

41

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 9
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:1

More often, however, the adoption of substantive rules is within
the agency's discretion, and its decision to proceed without rules
on a case-by-case basis will not be overturned.89 In all cases, the
petitioner would have to show standing in order to obtain judicial
review of the refusal.
Unlike the section on declaratory rulings, section 150A-16 does
not mandate a right of review and provide the form of review, but
says merely that denial of the petition to initiate rulemaking "shall
be considered a final agency decision for purposes of judicial review." Since there is no provision for taking evidence or hearing
other parties, the record presented to the reviewing court will consist only of the petition; any data, views and arguments which may
accompany the petition; and the agency's order of denial, including
its "reasons." Statutory review under section 150A-43 is obviously
inapplicable, since the proceedings are not of a judicial or quasijudicial character. Under North Carolina decisions, the appropriate
method of review, if review is available, would be action for declaratory judgment.90
V.

CONCLUSION

Our survey has indicated that the attorney must be prepared
89. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (court held that in determining the meaning of "managerial employees" exempt from the National Labor Relations Act, the Board could proceed case-by-case rather then by rule).
Supra note 1, at 180. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) ("the choice
between proceeding by general rule or by individual ad hoc litigation is one that
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency"); see 1 F.
COOPER, supra note 1.
90. Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971) (where the Board
of Paroles under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-62 (1978) revoked plaintiff's parole and
directed that his former and current sentences be served consecutively, and where
plaintiff's attack on the constitutionality of the statute could not be pursued
under the Post Conviction Act, habeas corpus or the former judicial review statute N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1969), held that the Declaratory Judgment Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1969), provided an appropriate remedy). The same result should be reached under the N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43
(1978) provision: "Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any person from invoking any judicial remedy available to him under the law to test the validity of any
administrative action not made reviewable under this Article." Snow v. North
Carolina Board of Architecture, 273 N.C. 559, 160 S.E.2d 719 (1968) (mandamus
lies only where plaintiff has no other adequate remedy). City of Hickory v. Catawba Valley Mach. Co., 39 N.C. App. 236, 249 S.E.2d 851 (1978) (collateral attack on agency order by defense to enforcement after order becomes final is not
allowable).
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to proceed with caution past the pitfalls involved in each method
of seeking agency guidance or relief not involving a contested case.
We have discussed these approaches to the agency:
(1) Informal requests for advice. Such a request is the easiest first step towards settling a troublesome question of agency authority, and normally the agency will adhere to the advice given. If
the attorney disagrees with the advice he receives, he is not compelled to follow it, provided that he and his client are willing to
take the risks of adverse regulatory action if the advice is unfavorable, and he cannot compel the agency to adhere to the advice if it
is favorable. Seeking informal advice, while often necessary, should
therefore be pursued only with full appreciation of its risks.
(2) Requests for declaratory rulings. NCAPA section 150A17 establishes the procedural and substantive framework for such
requests. The section was intended as protection to the agency and
the petitioner against the risks of informal advice, but it is seriously defective and in need of revision. The chief defects arise
from the failure of the legislature to take clear positions on what
kind of "given" facts are appropriate for ruling, whether the
"facts" are open to contest and what are the availability and scope
of judicial review. Present agency rules under the section largely
fail to correct these defects, although the agencies probably have
statutory authority to make substantial corrections by their rules.
The section and the present rules fall short of the apparent purpose of the draftsmen because the attorney proposing to submit a
petition must still determine at his peril whether his petition will
lay the foundation for judicial review if the agency's ruling is unsatisfactory; the attorney must determine whether the ruling he
obtains is within the agency's powers, otherwise the "binding" effect will be lost; and the agency can still "prospectively" change
the ruling, even though long-term commitments have been made in
reliance on it. The limitations on the "binding" effect of the ruling,
and the possible lack of availability of judicial review, leave the
client exposed to some of the risks of seeking informal advice,
while he assumes the additional risk of being bound in some cases
by an erroneous interpretation of the law. In each instance the
risks of a petition under section 150A-17 must be fully weighed
against its advantages before proceeding.
(3) Petitions for promulgation, amendment or repeal of
rules. NCAPA section 150A-16, providing for such petitions, does
not suffer from the defects of section 150A-17, but its utility is severely limited by the fact that it leaves almost unreviewable discrePublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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tion to grant or deny the petition in the agency. However, the subject matter is clearly one within the agency's primary jurisdiction,
and section 150A-16 procedure must be followed to lay a foundation for appeal to the courts. Its advantage lies principally in the
fact that it does compel the agency to act, either affirmatively or
negatively, within thirty days.
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APPENDIX A
NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION ...... 45
1
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE .......... 47,
2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUDITOR ........ 52
3
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE .............
4
52
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION ........... 54
5
COUNCIL OF STATE ........................
6
55
DEPARTMENT
OF
CULTURAL
RESOURCES
55
7
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS .............
8
56
GOVERNOR AND LIEUTENANT
9
GOVERNOR (EXECUTIVE ORDERS) ........ 57
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES ... 57
10
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE ............. 65
11
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ................ 66
12
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR .................. 67
13
DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AND
14
VETERANS AFFAIRS ....................... 68
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL AND
15
ECONOMIC RESOURCES ....................

TITLE
TITLE
TITLE
TITLE
TITLE
TITLE

DEPARTMENT
PUBLIC EDUCATION.
DEPARTMENT
REVENUE ............
DEPARTMENT
STATE ...............
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION..
DEPARTMENT
STATE TREASURER.
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARDS..

68
...71
...72
...73
...74
..75

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 1
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER

1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES

SUBCHAPTER 1A-Organization of the Department
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Departmental Administrative
Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Use of Public Buildings and Grounds

CHAPTER

2-STATE BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

SUBCHAPTER 2A-Division of State Budget and
Management
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Appropriations and Allotments
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2C-Reporting on Appropriations
2D-Fiscal Policies and Regulations
2E-Travel Transportation and Allowances
2F-Disbursing
2G-Advisory Budget Commission

3-GENERAL SERVICES

SUBCHAPTER 3A-Physical Plant
SUBCHAPTER 3B-Grounds
SUBCHAPTER 3C-Security
CHAPTER 4-AUXILIARY SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER 4A-State-owned Parking Lots
SUBCHAPTER 4B-Inter Office Mail Service
SUBCHAPTER 4C-Central Motor Pool
CHAPTER 5-PURCHASE AND CONTRACT
SUBCHAPTER 5A-Division of Purchase and Contract
SUBCHAPTER 5B-Purchase Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 5C-Surplus Property
SUBCHAPTER 5D-Consultants and Contractual Services

CHAPTER

6-STATE PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION

SUBCHAPTER 6A-Division of State Property and
Construction
SUBCHAPTER 6B-Real Property
SUBCHAPTER 6C-State Construction Office
SUBCHAPTER 6D-Capital Building Authority
CHAPTER 7-OFFICE OF

STATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 8-OFFICE OF STATE PERSONNEL
SUBCHAPTER 8A-General Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 8B-State Personnel Commission
SUBCHAPTER 8C-Personnel Administration
SUBCHAPTER 8D-Compensation
SUBCHAPTER 8E-Employee Benefits
SUBCHAPTER 8F-Position Analysis
SUBCHAPTER 8G-Classifications
SUBCHAPTER 8H-Recruitment and Testing Section
SUBCHAPTER 81-Service to Local Government
SUBCHAPTER 8J -Employee Relations
SUBCHAPTER 8K-Personnel Training
CHAPTER

9-DIVISION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
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CHAPTER

10-STATE PLANNING

CHAPTER

11-HUMAN RELATIONS COUNCIL

CHAPTER

12-MARINE AFFAIRS

CHAPTER

13-OFFICE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

CHAPTER 14-NORTH CAROLINA DRUG COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER 14A-Organization of North Carolina Drug
Commission
SUBCHAPTER 14B-Manufacturers, Distributors, Dispensers and Researchers of Controlled
Substances
SUBCHAPTER 14C-Drug Treatment Facilities
SUBCHAPTER 14D-Procedure for Amending Rules
SUBCHAPTER 14E-Policies and Procedures for Grant
Review
CHAPTER

15-COMMISSION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

CHAPTER

16-CHILD DAY CARE LICENSING COMMISSION

CHAPTER

17-COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

CHAPTER

18-OFFICE OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING

CHAPTER

19-STATE YOUTH ADVISORY COUNCIL

CHAPTER

20-NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC
COMPENSATION PLAN

CHAPTER

21-ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS DIVISION

CHAPTER

22-CLEAN WATER BOND ACT

CHAPTER

23-REGIONAL WATER SUPPLY PLANNING ACT OF

CHAPTER

24-REGIONAL

SEWAGE

EMPLOYEE

DISPOSAL

DEFERRED

PLANNING

1971

ACT

OF

1971
CHAPTER

25-NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

ACT

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 2
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
CHAPTER

1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
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CHAPTER

2-RULEMAKING AND CONTESTED CASE PROCEDURES

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

2A-Departmental Rulemaking Procedures
2B-Contested Cases
2C-Conduct of Contested Cases
2D-Decisions in Contested Cases

CHAPTER

3-COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE

CHAPTER

4-BOARD OF AGRICULTURE

CHAPTER

5-DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE

CHAPTER 6-PUBLIC

CHAPTER

AFFAIRS OFFICE

7-ANIMAL HEALTH DIVISION

SUBCHAPTER 7A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 7B-Rules and Regulations Ador )ted by
Reference
SUBCHAPTER 7C-Diagnostic Laboratories
SUBCHAPTER 7D-Animal Diseases
SUBCHAPTER 7E-Hog Cholera and Garbage Feed ing
SUBCHAPTER 7F-Meat Inspection
SUBCHAPTER 7G-Poultry Products Inspection
SUBCHAPTER 7H-Poultry Diseases
SUBCHAPTER 71-Rendering Plants
SUBCHAPTER 7J -Livestock Market Regulations
SUBCHAPTER 7K-Biological Residues in Animals
SUBCHAPTER 7L-Livestock Branding

CHAPTER 8-CONSUMER STANDARDS DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 8A-Organizational Rules
SUBCHAPTER 8B-Rules and Regulations
Reference
SUBCHAPTER 8C-Engineering Section
SUBCHAPTER 8D-Measurement Section
SUBCHAPTER 8E-Analytical Section

Adopted by

CHAPTER 9-FOOD AND DRUG PROTECTION DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 9A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 9B-Rules and Standards Adopted

by

Reference

SUBCHAPTER 9C-Current Good. Manufacturing Practices
for Specific Food Industries

SUBCHAPTER 9D-Canned Dog and Cat Food
SUBCHAPTER 9E-Feed

SUBCHAPTER 9F-Internal Combustion Engine Antifreezes
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SUBCHAPTER 9G-Milk and Milk Products
SUBCHAPTER 9H-Disposition of Damaged or Unclean
Foods
SUBCHAPTER 91-Procedures for Handling Complaints
CHAPTER 10-PEST CONTROL DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 10A-Organization Rules
SUBCHAPTER 1OB-Plant Protection Section; Biological
Activities
SUBCHAPTER 1OC-Plant Protection Section; Plant Pest
Activities
SUBCHAPTER 1OD-Pesticides Section
SUBCHAPTER 10E-Structural Pest Section
CHAPTER 11-SEED AND FERTILIZER DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 1lA-Organizational Rules
SUBCHAPTER liB-Liming Materials and Fertilizers
SUBCHAPTER 11C-Seeds

CHAPTER 12-AGRONoMIC DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 12A-General
SUBCHAPTER 12B-Description of Major Program Areas
CHAPTER 13-CROP STATISTICS DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 13A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 13B-Goals and Objectives
SUBCHAPTER 13C-Specific Means Used to Reach the Program's Goals and Objectives

SUBCHAPTER 13D-Relation to Federal Government, Local
Government and Other
Departments
SUBCHAPTER 13E-Adoption by Reference

State

CHAPTER 14-FoOD DISTRIBUTION DIVISION
CHAPTER 15-MARKETs DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 15A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 15B-Goals and Policies;
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

Section
15C-Agricultural
15D-Agricultural
Section
15E-Cooperative
15F-Engineering
15G-Field Crops

Market

Fairs Section
Product

News

Promotion

Services Section
Section
Section
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15H-Livestock Section
151 -Horticultural Crops Section
15J -Poultry Section
15K-Market Rules and Regulations

CHAPTER 16-RESEARCH STATIONS DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 16A-Purpose
SUBCHAPTER 16B-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 16C-Research Stations
SUBCHAPTER 16D-Services

CHAPTER

17-STATE FARM OPERATIONS DIVISION

SUBCHAPTER 17A-General
SUBCHAPTER 17B-Cooperation
SUBCHAPTER 17C-State Farms

CHAPTER

18-MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

SUBCHAPTER 18A-General
SUBCHAPTER 18B-Services to Community

CHAPTER

19-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION

SUBCHAPTER 19A-General Goals and Objectives
SUBCHAPTER 19B-Personnel

CHAPTER 20-THE
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

NORTH CAROLINA STATE FAIR

20A-Organization
20B-Regulations of the State Fair
20C-Premium Book
20D-Premium Book; Horse Show

CHAPTER 21-STATE FARMERS' MARKET
SUBCHAPTER 21A-Organizational Rules
SUBCHAPTER 21B-Authority, Duties and Responsibility
of Manager

SUBCHAPTER 21C-Fees, Charges and Rentals
SUBCHAPTER 21D-Operations
SUBCHAPTER 21E-Farmers' Market Lease Agreement
CHAPTER 22-N.C.

RURAL REHABILITATION CORPORATION

SUBCHAPTER 22A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 22B-Meetings

CHAPTER 23-SWINE

DISEASE COMMITTEE

SUBCHAPTER 23A-General
SUBCHAPTER 23B-Purpose
SUBCHAPTER 23C-Meetings
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24-LIVESTOCK MARKET ADVISORY BOARD

SUBCHAPTER 24A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 24B-Duties
SUBCHAPTER 24C-Meetings

CHAPTER

25-GASOLINE AND OIL INSPECTION BOARD

SUBCHAPTER 25A-Membership and Duties
SUBCHAPTER 25B-Rules and Regulations (Repealed)
SUBCHAPTER 25C-Gasoline and Oil Inspection

CHAPTER 26-N.C.
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

STRUCTURAL PEST CONTROL COMMITTEE

26A-Organization
26B-Meetings
26C-Hearings
26D-Regulation Adoption

27-PESTICIDE BOARD

SUBCHAPTER 27A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 27B-Meetings
SUBCHAPTER 27C-Regulation Adoption

CHAPTER

28-PESTICIDE ADVISORY BOARD

SUBCHAPTER 28A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 28B-Functions
SUBCHAPTER 28C-Meetings
CHAPTER 29-BOARD OF CROP SEED IMPROVEMENT
SUBCHAPTER 29A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 29B-Duties
SUBCHAPTER 29C-Meetings
CHAPTER 30-STATE FARM OPERATIONS COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER 30A-Purpose, Objective and Organization
SUBCHAPTER 30B-Powers and Duties
SUBCHAPTER 30C-Meetings

CHAPTER 31-THE

NORTH

CAROLINA

AGRICULTURAL

HALL OF

FAME

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

31A-Purpose
31B-Board of Directors
31C-Eligibility
31D-Meetings

32-ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATURAL HISTORY MUSEUM

SUBCHAPTER 32A-Purpose
SUBCHAPTER 32B-Organization
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SUBCHAPTER 32C-Meetings
CHAPTER 33-CATTLE DISEASE COMMITTEE
SUBCHAPTER 33A-General
SUBCHAPTER 33B-Purpose
SUBCHAPTER 33C-Meetings
CHAPTER

34-STRUCTURAL PEST CONTROL DIVISION

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUDITOR
CHAPTER

1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES

CHAPTER 2-LAw

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' BENEFIT AND RETIRE-

MENT FUND

CHAPTER

3-NORTH CAROLINA FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND

CHAPTER

4-STATE BOARD OF PENSIONS

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 4
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Rulemaking Hearings, Emergency Rules
and Declaratory Rulings
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Personnel Rules
SUBCHAPTER 1D-Budget Division Rules
CHAPTER 2-BOARD OF ALCOHOLIC CONTROL
SUBCHAPTER 2A-Organizational Rules
SUBCHAPTER 2B-General Policies for State Board
SUBCHAPTER 2C-Local Boards of Alcoholic Control
SUBCHAPTER 2D-Purchase, Distribution and Sale of Spirituous Liquors
SUBCHAPTER 2E-Malt Beverages; Retail
SUBCHAPTER 2F-Malt Beverages; Wholesalers; Manufacturers
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
CHAPTER

RULINGS

2G-Social Establishments
2H-Restaurants and Related Places
21 -Special Permits
2J -Retail Wine
2K-Wine; Manufacturers, Bottlers
Wholesalers

3-BANKING

and

COMMISSION

3A-Organization
3B-Rulemaking and Contested Cases
3C-Banks
3D-Banks Acting in a Fiduciary Capacity
3E-Licensees Under North Carolina Consumer Finance Act
SUBCHAPTER 3F-Licensees Under Sale of Checks Acts
SUBCHAPTER 3G-Funeral and Burial Trust Funds

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

4-BURIAL COMMISSION

CHAPTER 5-CEMETERY COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER 5A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 5B-Rulemaking, Declaratory Rulings and
Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 5C-Licensing
SUBCHAPTER 5D-Trust Funds
CHAPTER 6-CREDIT UNION DIVISION; CREDIT UNION COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER 6A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 6B-Rulemaking, Declaratory Rulings and
Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 6C-Credit Unions

CHAPTER 7-MiNK
CHAPTER

COMMISSION

8-RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AUTHORITY

CHAPTER 9-SAVINGS AND LOAN DIVISION; SAVINGS AND LOAN
COMMISSION

SUBCHAPTER 9A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 9B-Rulemaking, Declaratory Rulings and
Contested Cases

SUBCHAPTER 9C-Operation of State-chartered Savings
and Loan Associations
SUBCHAPTER 9D-Savings Accounts, Shares, Bonus Plans
and Contract for Savings Programs
SUBCHAPTER 9E-Mortgage Loans, Share Loans and Loan
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Expenses
SUBCHAPTER 9F-Investments and Fiscal Agent
SUBCHAPTER 9G-Regulations Relative to Certain Tax
Matters
SUBCHAPTER 9H-Service Corporations

CHAPTER

10-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CHAPTER

11-UTILITIES COMMISSION

CHAPTER

12-ENERGY DIVISION

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 5
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

CHAPTER

1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES

SUBCHAPTER 1A-Organization of the Department
Correction
SUBCHAPTER 1B-General Administration
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Fiscal Administration
SUBCHAPTER 1D-Staff Development and Training

CHAPTER

of

2-DIVISION OF PRISONS

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

2A-Organization and Personal Conduct
2B-Inmate Conduct Rules, Discipline
2C-Classification
2D-Public Communications
2E-Treatment
2F-Custody and Security
2G-Court Related Procedures

CHAPTER 3-DIVISION OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
SUBCHAPTER 3A-General Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 3B-Interstate Compact for Out-of-state Parolee Supervision
SUBCHAPTER 3C-Investigations
SUBCHAPTER 3D-Supervision
SUBCHAPTER 3E-Interstate Compact for Out-of-state Parolee and Probationer Supervision

CHAPTER

4-PAROLE COMMISSION

SUBCHAPTER 4A-Organization of the Parole Commission
SUBCHAPTER 4B-Duties and Responsibilities of the
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

Commission
4C-Policy, Review and Investigation
4D-Procedure; Review and Investigation
4E-Work Release
4F-Parole Supervision, Discharge and
Revocation

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 6
COUNCIL OF STATE
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES

CHAPTER

2-RULEMAKING PROCEDURES

CHAPTER

3-ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CHAPTER

4-DECLARATORY RULINGS

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 7
DEPARTMENT OF CULTURAL RESOURCES
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-Department of Cultural Resources
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Procedural Rules
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Personnel
SUBCHAPTER 1D-North Carolina Awards Committee
CHAPTER 2-DIVISION OF STATE LIBRARY
SUBCHAPTER 2A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Technical Services
SUBCHAPTER 2C-Information Services
SUBCHAPTER 2D-Library for the Blind and Physically
Handicapped
SUBCHAPTER 2E-Public Library Development Services
SUBCHAPTER 2F-North Carolina Public Librarian Certification Commission
CHAPTER

3-DIVISION OF THE ARTS

SUBCHAPTER 3A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 3B-North Carolina Museum of Art
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
CHAPTER
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3C-Community
3D-Theatre Arts Section
3E-Art Museum Building Commission
3F-Art Commission

4-DIVISION OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

4A-Divisional Rules
4B-Archives and Records Section
4C-Historic Sites Regulations
4D-Museum of History
4E-Historical Publications Section
4F-State Capitol and Visitor Center
4G-Historic Preservation Section
4H-Highway Historical Marker Program
41 -Tryon Palace Section
4J -Exploration and Salvage Regulations
4K-Environmental Review

CHAPTER 5-U.S.S.

NORTH CAROLINA BATTLESHIP COMMISSION

CHAPTER

6-TRYON PALACE COMMISSION

CHAPTER

7-HISTORIC BATH COMMISSION

CHAPTER

8-HISTORIC MURFREESBORO

CHAPTER

9-EDENTON HISTORICAL COMMISSION

CHAPTER 10-JOHN

MOTLEY MOREHEAD MEMORIAL COMMISSION

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 8
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES

CHAPTER

2-CONTESTS WITH RESPECT TO ELECTIONS

CHAPTER

3-CHARGES AGAINST COUNTY ELECTION OFFICIALS

CHAPTER

4-VOTING EQUIPMENT

CHAPTER

5-MODIFIED FULL TIME REGISTRATION SYSTEM
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NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 9
GOVERNOR AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
(EXECUTIVE ORDERS)
Executive Orders are arranged sequentially by number and must
be requested by number.
NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 10
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Procedure
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Personnel
SUBCHAPTER 1D-Information
SUBCHAPTER 1E-Property
SUBCHAPTER 1F-Reimbursement
SUBCHAPTER 1G-Plans and Programs
SUBCHAPTER 1H-Volunteer Services
SUBCHAPTER 1I -General Policies
SUBCHAPTER 1J-1122 Program

CHAPTER

2-CONFEDERATE WOMEN'S

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

HoME

2A-General Provisions
2B-Definitions
2C-Admission
2D-Conduct of Residents
2E-Meals

3-FACILITY SERVICES

3A-Identifying Information
3B-Procedural Rules
3C-Licensing of Hospitals
3D-Rules and Regulations Governing Ambulance Service
SUBCHAPTER 3E-Certifications of Clinics for Abortion
SUBCHAPTER 3F-Licensure of Nursing Home
Administrators
SUBCHAPTER 3G-Radiation Protection
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
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SUBCHAPTER 3H-Licensing of Nursing Homes and Intermediate Care Facilities
Operation of Juvenile Detention
Facilities
3J -The Operation of Local Confinement
Facilities
3K-The Educational Loan Program
3L-The Licensing of Home Health Agencies
3M-Minimum Standards for Mobile Intensive Care Units
3N-Guidelines Health Care Facilities Finance Act

SUBCHAPTER 31 -The
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
CHAPTER

4-HEALTH SERVICES

SUBCHAPTER 4A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 4B-Procedural Rules
CHAPTER 5-HEALTH; ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

CHAPTER

6-HEALTH; DENTAL HEALTH

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

6A-School Water Fluoridation
6B-Fluoride Mouthrinse Program
6C-Fluoride Brush-in Program
6D-Dental Care Program

7-HEALTH; EPIDEMIOLOGY

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

7A-Acute Communicable Disease Control
7B-Highway Safety
7C-Occupational Health
7D-Tuberculosis Control
7E-Veneral Disease Control
7F-Veterinary Public Health
7G-Vital Records

CHAPTER 8-HEALTH; PERSONAL HEALTH
SUBCHAPTER 8A-Chronic Disease
SUBCHAPTER 8B1-Maternal and Child Health
SUBCHAPTER 8C-Nutrition and Dietary Services
SUBCHAPTER 8D-Crippled Children; Developmental Disabilities Branch

SUBCHAPTER 8E-Developmental Evaluation Centers; Developmental Disabilities Branch

SUBCHAPTER 8F-Sickle Cell Syndrome; Genetic Counseling; Developmental Disabilities Branch

SUBCHAPTER 8G-Prenatal Care
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SUBCHAPTER 8H-Family Planning

CHAPTER

9-HEALTH; LABORATORY

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

9A-General Policies
9B-Biochemistry
9C-Environmental Sciences
9D-Certification and Improvement
9E-Microbiology
9F-Syphilis Serology
9G-Virology
9H-Cancer Cytology

CHAPTER 10-HEALTH SERVICES; SANITARY ENGINEERING
SUBCHAPTER 1OA-Sanitation
SUBCHAPTER 1OB-Shellfish Sanitation
SUBCHAPTER 1OC-Solid Waste and Vector Control
SUBCHAPTER 1OD-Water Supplies
SUBCHAPTER 10E-Water Treatment Facility Operations

CHAPTER

11-MEDICAL EXAMINER; DEATH INVESTIGATION

CHAPTER

12-HEALTH; OFFICE OF LOCAL SERVICES

CHAPTER

13-HEALTH; SPECIALTY HOSPITALS

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

14-MENTAL HEALTH; GENERAL

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

14A-Identifying Information
14B-Rules of Procedure
14C-General Rules
14D-Policies on Inpatient and Related Services; Serious Mental and Emotional
Disorders

15-MENTAL HEALTH; HOSPITALS

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

CHAPTER

13A-Identifying Information
13B-Procedure
13D-Lenox Baker Hospital
13E-North Carolina Orthopedic Hospital
13F-Pulmonary Hospitals

15A-General Rules for Hospitals
15B-Broughton Hospital
15C-Cherry Hospital
15D-Dorothea Dix Hospital
15E-John Umstead Hospital

16-MENTAL HEALTH;

MR

CENTERS
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16A-General Rules for MR Centers
16E-Caswell Center
16C-Murdoch Center
16D-O'Berry Center
16E-Western Carolina Center; Identifying
Information

CHAPTER 17-MENTAL HEALTH; AR CENTERS
SUBCHAPTER 17A-General Rules for AR Centers
SUBCHAPTER 17B-Black Mountain AR Center
SUBCHAPTER 17C-Butner AR Center
SUBCHAPTER 17D-Walter B. Jones Alcoholic Rehabilitation Center
CHAPTER 18-MENTAL HEALTH; OTHER PROGRAMS

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

18A-Wright School
18B-Butner Ordinances
18C-Effect and Applicability of Chapter 18
18D-General Standards
18E-Balanced and Integrated Programming
18F-Program Support Standards
18G-Consumer Record Standards
18H-Manpower Standards
181 -Essential Services; Generally
18J -Essential Services Program Requirements for Mental Health
18L-Essential Services Program Requirements for Adult Mental Health
18M-Essential Services Program Requirements for Alcoholism
18N-Essential Services Program Requirements for Drug Abuse
180-Standards for Optional Mental Retardation Service Programs
18P-Standards for Optional Child Mental
Health Programs
18Q-Standards for Optional Alcoholism
Services Programs

CHAPTER 19-SERVICES FOR THE BLIND
SUBCHAPTER 19A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 19B-Procedural Rules
SUBCHAPTER 19C-Business Enterprises Program
SUBCHAPTER 19D-Homebound Blind; Self-employment
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

Program
19E-Supplemental Aid to the Blind
19F-Special Adaptive Services
19G-Vocational Rehabilitation
19H-Medical/Eye Care Program
191 -State
Standards of Performance for
Workshops Serving the Blind

Chapter 20-DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER 20A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 20B-Procedure
SUBCHAPTER 20C-Program Rules
SUBCHAPTER 20D-Standards for Facilities and Providers
SUBCHAPTER 20F-Governor's Council on Employment of
the Handicapped

CHAPTER 21-THE

GOVERNOR MOREHEAD SCHOOL

SUBCHAPTER 21A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 21B-Campus Regulations
SUBCHAPTER 21C-Procedure

CHAPTER

22-OFFICE FOR AGING

SUBCHAPTER 22A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 22B-Title III
SUBCHAPTER 22C-Title VII

CHAPTER 23-N.C.

SCHOOLS FOR THE DEAF

SUBCHAPTER 23A-Administration
SUBCHAPTER 23B-Campus Regulations
SUBCHAPTER 23C-Rulemaking Procedures
CHAPTER 24-SocIAL SERVICES; GENERAL

CHAPTER 25-SocIAL
CHAPTER

SERVICES; PROCEDURE

26-MEDICAL SERVICES

SUBCHAPTER 26A- Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 26B-Medical Services Provided
SUBCHAPTER 26C-Amount, Duration and Scope of
Assistance
SUBCHAPTER 26D-Limitations on Amount, Duration and
Scope
SUBCHAPTER 26E-Cooperative Agreements
SUBCHAPTER 26F-Manuals and Forms

CHAPTER

27-CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
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CHAPTER 28-DISABILITY DETERMINATION
CHAPTER 29-INCOME MAINTENANCE;

GENERAL

CHAPTER 30-FooD ASSISTANCE
CHAPTER 31-AFDC
SUBCHAPTER 31A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 31B-Definitions
SUBCHAPTER 31C-Eligibility
SUBCHAPTER 31D-Application Process
SUBCHAPTER 31E-Change of Situation
SUBCHAPTER 31F-Redetermination of Eligibility
SUBCHAPTER 31G-Authorization of Change in Payment
SUBCHAPTER 31H-Forms Used for Application, Eligibility
and Furnishing Assistance
SUBCHAPTER 311 -Work Registration
SUBCHAPTER 31J -Eligibility Verification
SUBCHAPTER 31K-Need
SUBCHAPTER 31L-Reserve
SUBCHAPTER 31M-Income
SUBCHAPTER 31N-Computing the Budget
SUBCHAPTER 310-Forms Used for Income, Reserve and
Budgeting
SUBCHAPTER 31P-AFDC-FC
SUBCHAPTER 31Q-Protective and Vendor Payments
SUBCHAPTER 31R-Paternity and Support
SUBCHAPTER 31S-Miscellaneous
CHAPTER 32-MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
SUBCHAPTER 32A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 32B-Definitions
SUBCHAPTER 32C-Eligibility
SUBCHAPTER 32D-Application Process
SUBCHAPTER 32E-Eligibility Determination
SUBCHAPTER 32F-Reserve
SUBCHAPTER 32G-Income
SUBCHAPTER 32H-Maintenance and Budgeting Principles
SUBCHAPTER 321 -AFDC-MA; Specified Relative;
Deprivation
SUBCHAPTER 32J -Disability and Blindness
Determination
SUBCHAPTER 32K-Spend-down; Patient's Monthly
Liability
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
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32L-Certification and Authorization
32M-Classification
32N-Identification Card
320-Change in Situation
32P-Redetermination of Eligibility
32Q-Client Fraud
32R-Miscellaneous

CHAPTER 33-STATE/COUNTY SPECIAL ASSISTANCE
SUBCHAPTER 33A-General
SUBCHAPTER 33B-Coverage
SUBCHAPTER 33C-Application Process
SUBCHAPTER 33D-Age, Citizenship and Residence
SUBCHAPTER 33E-Reserve
SUBCHAPTER 33F-Income
SUBCHAPTER 33G-Disability Determination
SUBCHAPTER 33H-Special Need
SUBCHAPTER 331 -Budgeting Principles
SUBCHAPTER 33J -Mixed Budgeting for Groups I and II
SUBCHAPTER 33K-Payment Procedures for Groups I and
II
SUBCHAPTER 33L-Change in Situation
SUBCHAPTER 33M-Redetermination of Eligibility
SUBCHAPTER 33N-Eligibility for Medical Assistance
SUBCHAPTER 330-Personal Representative
SUBCHAPTER 33P-Guardianship or Trustee Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 33Q-Financial Responsibility
SUBCHAPTER 33R-Miscellaneous
CHAPTER 34-INCOME MAINTENANCE; MISCELLANEOUS
SUBCHAPTER 34A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 34B-Cooperative Agreements and
Coordination
CHAPTER 35-FAMILY SERVICES; GENERAL
CHAPTER 36-CONTRACT SERVICES
CHAPTER 37-PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES

CHAPTER 38-PACE
SUBCHAPTER 38A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 38B-PACE Program
SUBCHAPTER 38C-Pay Program
SUBCHAPTER 38D-Place Program
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CHAPTER 39-WIN

SUBCHAPTER 39A-Identifying Information; Manual
SUBCHAPTER 39B-Models
CHAPTER 40-JOB CORPS
CHAPTER 41-CHILDREN'S

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

SERVICES

41A-Identifying Information
41B-Manuals and Forms; Coverage
41C-Day Care Center Certification
41D-Family Day Care Home Certification
41E-Licensing of Group Homes for
Children
41F-Licensing of Family Foster Homes
41G-Child Care Institution Standards
41H-Adoption Standards
411 -Protective Services
41J -Foster Home Fund
41K-Interstate Laws
41L-Delinquency Prevention

CHAPTER 42-INDMDUAL AND FAMILY SUPPORT
SUBCHAPTER 42A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 42B-Licensing of Homes for Developmentally Disabled Adults
SUBCHAPTER 42C-Licensing of Family Care Homes
SUBCHAPTER 42D-Licensing of Homes for the Aged and
Infirm
SUBCHAPTER 42E-Day Activity for Adults
SUBCHAPTER 42F-Maternity Home Fund
SUBCHAPTER 42G-Family Planning Services
SUBCHAPTER 42H-Other Services
SUBCHAPTER 421 -Employment
and Training Support
Services
SUBCHAPTER 42J -Health Support Services
SUBCHAPTER 42K-Preparation and Delivery of Meals
SUBCHAPTER 42L-Legal Services
SUBCHAPTER 42M-Information and Referral Services
SUBCHAPTER 42N-Transportation Services
SUBCHAPTER 420-Personal and Family Counseling
SUBCHAPTER 42P-Chore Services
CHAPTER 43-TITLE XX COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL SERVICES PROGRAM PLAN
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

43A-General Information
43B-General Policies
43C-Eligibility for Services
43D-Services to Be Provided

CHAPTER 44-DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER 44A-Identifying Information
SUBCHAPTER 44B-North Carolina Minimum Standards
for Juvenile Detention Facilities
NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 11
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL
CHAPTER

RULES

2-SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION

CHAPTER 3-ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION

CHAPTER

4-CONSUMER INSURANCE INFORMATION DIVISION

CHAPTER 5-FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES DIVISION
CHAPTER

6-AGENTS' LICENSING DIVISION

CHAPTER

7-STATE PROPERTY FIRE INSURANCE FUND DIVISION

CHAPTER 8-ENGINEERING AND BUILDING CODES DIVISION

CHAPTER

9-INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

CHAPTER 10-FIRE AND CASUALTY DIVISION
CHAPTER 11-COMPANY OPERATIONS DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 11A-General Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 1lB-Securities
SUBCHAPTER 11C-Examinations Operational Unit
SUBCHAPTER liD-Liquidation and Merger Operations
Unit
SUBCHAPTER 11E-Tax, Audit and Statistical Operational
Unit
SUBCHAPTER 11F-Actuarial Operational Unit
CHAPTER 12-LIFE, ACCIDENT AND HEALTH DIVISION
CHAPTER 13-SPECIAL SERVICES DIVISION
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14-ADMISSIONS DIVISION

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 12
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CHAPTER

1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES

CHAPTER 2-OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBCHAPTER 2A-Office Rules
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Rulemaking and Administrative Hearing Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 2C-Division Two
SUBCHAPTER 2D-Division Three
SUBCHAPTER 2E-Division Four
SUBCHAPTER 2F-Division Five
SUBCHAPTER 2G-Administrative Procedures Rules for
Filing

SUBCHAPTER 2H-Torrens Act Rules and Forms
SUBCHAPTER 21 -Company and Railroad Police
CHAPTER

3-STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHAPTER 4-POLICE INFORMATION NETWORK
SUBCHAPTER 4A-Organizational Rules
SUBCHAPTER 4B-Office Rules
SUBCHAPTER 4C-Management Control
SUBCHAPTER 4D-Rulemaking and Administrative Hearings Procedures
CHAPTER

5-TRAINING AND STANDARDS

COUNCIL

CHAPTER 6-THE NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE ACADEMY
SUBCHAPTER 6A-Organization and Rules
SUBCHAPTER 6B-Rulemaking and Administrative Hearing Procedures
CHAPTER

7-PRIVATE PROTECTIVE SERVICES

CHAPTER

8-GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION
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NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 13
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-General Provisions and Organization
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Rulemaking and Administrative Hearing Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Personnel Rules
CHAPTER

2-APPRENTICESHIP DIVISION

CHAPTER

3-BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL DIVISION

CHAPTER

4-CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION DIVISION

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

4A-Division Rules
4B-Voluntary Arbitration
4C-Mediation
4D-Technical and Educational Services

CHAPTER 5-ELEVATOR DIVISION

CHAPTER

6-MINE AND QUARRY DIVISION

CHAPTER 7-OFFICE OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
SUBCHAPTER 7A-General Rules
SUBCHAPTER 7B-Occupational Safety and Health Act
Operational Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 7C-Safety and Health
SUBCHAPTER 7D-Standards Interpretation
SUBCHAPTER 7E-Construction; Standards Interpretations
CHAPTER

8-STATISTICS DIVISION

CHAPTER 9-STATE EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 9A-General Rules
SUBCHAPTER 9B-Procedures and Rules
SUBCHAPTER 9C-Wage, Hour and Child Labor Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 9D-Private Employment Agency
Provisions
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NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 14
DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AND
VETERANS AFFAIRS
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-General Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Rulemaking and Administrative
Hearings
CHAPTER

2-THE NATIONAL GUARD

CHAPTER 3-DvISION OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
SUBCHAPTER 3A-Division of Veterans Affairs; General
Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 3B-Veterans Affairs Commission
CHAPTER

4-CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

CHAPTER 5-ENERGY (Transferred to 4 NCHC 15)
SUBCHAPTER 5A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 5B-Energy Policy Council
CHAPTER 6-CIVIL
CHAPTER

AIR PATROL

7-STATE HIGHWAY PATROL

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 15
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL AND
ECONOMIC RESOURCES
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-General Organization
SUBCHAPTER 1B-General Administration
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Interim Regulations Relating to Management of Core Banks Recreation Area
SUBCHAPTER 1D-Conformity with North Carolina Environmental Policy Act
CHAPTER 2-ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
SUBCHAPTER 2A-Organization of Environmental Management Commission
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Surface Water Standards, Monitoring
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

2C-Well Construction Standards
2D-Air Pollution Control Requirements
2E-Capacity Use Area Water Withdrawal
2F-Construction Grants
2G-Water Resources Programs
2H-Procedures for Permits, Approvals
21 -Hearings
2J -Civil Penalties
2K-Dam Safety

CHAPTER 3-MARINE FISHERIES
SUBCHAPTER 3A-Division Rules
Regulations for Coastal
SUBCHAPTER 3B-Fisheries
Waters
SUBCHAPTER 3C-Licenses, Permits and Leases
SUBCHAPTER 3D-Dredge and Fill
SUBCHAPTER 3E-Marine Fisheries Commission
SUBCHAPTER 3F-Jurisdiction of Agencies; Classification
of Waters
CHAPTER

4-SEDIMENTATION CONTROL

SUBCHAPTER 4A-Sedimentation Control Commission
Organization
SUBCHAPTER 4B-Erosion and Sediment Control
SUBCHAPTER 4C-Sedimentation Control Civil Penalties
SUBCHAPTER 4D-Local Ordinances
CHAPTER 5-MINING, MINERAL RESOURCES
SUBCHAPTER 5A-Organization and Administration
SUBCHAPTER 5B-Mining Permitting Regulations
SUBCHAPTER 5C-Geophysical. Exploration
SUBCHAPTER 5D-Oil and Gas Conservation
SUBCHAPTER 5E-Disposition of Mineral Deposits on
State Lands Under Water
CHAPTER 6-Son. AND WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER 6A-Organization and Operation
SUBCHAPTER 6B-District Programs; Reorganization, Expenses and Eminent Domain
SUBCHAPTER 6C-Small Watershed Programs
CHAPTER 7-COASTAL RESOURCES COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER 7A-Organization and Duties
SUBCHAPTER 7B-Land Use Planning Guidelines
SUBCHAPTER 7C-Grant Criteria and Procedures for FirstPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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phase Coastal Resources Planning

SUBCHAPTER 7D-Generally Applicable Standards of Review for. Land Use Plans and Synopses
SUBCHAPTER 7E-Criteria for Local Enforcement and Implementation Plans
Environmental
of
Areas
SUBCHAPTER 7F-Interim
Concern
SUBCHAPTER 7G-Notice Requirement of the Interim Area
of Environmental Concern Program

CHAPTER

8-WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT OPERATORS CERTIFICATION COMMISSION

SUBCHAPTER 8A-Authority, Organization, Structure, DefSUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

initions and Hearing Procedures
8B-Certification of Operators
8C-Classification of Wastewater Treatment
Facilities
8D-Powers and Enforcement
8E-Training Wastewater Treatment Plant
Operators

CHAPTER 9-DIviSION OF FOREST RESOURCES
SUBCHAPTER 9A-Division Organization
SUBCHAPTER 9B-Delegation
SUBCHAPTER 9C-Division Programs
CHAPTER 10-WILDLIFE RESOURCES AND WATER SAFETY
SUBCHPATER 10A-Wildlife Resources Commission
SUBCHAPTER 1OB-Hunting and Trapping
SUBCHAPTER 10C-Inland Fishing Regulations
SUBCHAPTER 1OD-Game Lands Regulations
SUBCHAPTER 10E-Fishing and Boating Access Areas
SUBCHAPTER 1OF-Motorboats and Water Safety
SUBCHAPTER 10G-Distribution and Sale of Hunting,
Fishing and Trapping License

SUBCHAPTER 1OH-Regulated Activities
SUBCHAPTER 101 -Endangered and Threatened Species
CHAPTER 11-LAw

AND ORDER

CHAPTER 12-PARKS AND RECREATION AREA RULES
SUBCHAPTER 12A-Organization and Duties
SUBCHAPTER 12B-Parks and Recreation Areas
SUBCHAPTER 12C-State Lakes Regulations
SUBCHAPTER 12D-Selection of Lands for Acquisition
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SUBCHAPTER 12E-North
Carolina
Regulations
CHAPTER

Zoological

Park

13-COMMUNITy ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

SUBCHAPTER 13A-Organization and Purpose
SUBCHAPTER 13B-Governor's Award Program
SUBCHAPTER 13C-Local Planning and Management
Grants

SUBCHAPTER 13D-Land and Water Conservation Fund
Grants-in-aid Program
SUBCHAPTER 13E-Travel Development Matching Grants
SUBCHAPTER 13F-Science and Technology
SUBCHAPTER 13G-Industrial and Pollution Control
Revenue Bonds

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 16
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-Rules of Organization
SUBCHAPTER 1B-'Rules of Practice
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Commissions
CHAPTER 2-PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
SUBCHAPTER 2A-State Superintendent of Public Instruction; General Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Regional Centers and Federal Relations
SUBCHAPTER 2C-Administrative Services
SUBCHAPTER 2D-Area of Human Relations and Student
Affairs
SUBCHAPTER 2E-Instructional Services Area
SUBCHAPTER 2F-Personnel Relations and Public Affairs
Area
SUBCHAPTER 2G-Planning, Research and Development
SUBCHAPTER 2H-Teacher Education Area
CHAPTER

3-CONTROLLER'S OFFICE

CHAPTER 4-DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES
SUBCHAPTER 4A-Rules of Organization
SUBCHAPTER 4B-The Comprehensive Community College
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System
SUBCHAPTER 4C-Institutions; Organizations
erations
SUBCHAPTER 4D-Institutions; Fiscal Affairs
SUBCHAPTER 4E-Educational Programs

and

Op-

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 17
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

CHAPTER 1I-DEPARTMENTAL

RULES

SUBCHAPTER 1A-Organization of the Department
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Personnel Rules
SUBCHAPTER 1C-General Administration
CHAPTER 2-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER 2A-Field Forces Division
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Accounting Division
SUBCHAPTER 2C-Planning and Processing Division
SUBCHAPTER 2D-Tax Research Division
SUBCHAPTER 2E-Supply and Service Division
CHAPTER 3-INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAX DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 3A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 3B-Inheritance Tax
SUBCHAPTER 3C-Gift Tax
CHAPTER 4-LICENSE AND EXCISE TAX DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 4A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 4B-License Taxes
SUBCHAPTER 4C-Cigarette Tax
SUBCHAPTER 4D-Soft Drink Tax
SUBCHAPTER 4E-Intoxicating Liquors Tax
SUBCHAPTER 4F-Excise Stamp Tax on Conveyances
CHAPTER 5-CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAX DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 5A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 5B-Franchise Tax
SUBCHAPTER 5C-Corporate Income Tax
SUBCHAPTER 5D-Declaration of Income by Corporations
CHAPTER 6-INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 6A-Divisional Rules
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SUBCHAPTER 6B-Individual Income Tax
SUBCHAPTER 6C-Withholding
SUBCHAPTER 6D-Estimated Tax

CHAPTER

7-SALES AND USE TAX DIVISION

SUBCHAPTER 7A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 7B-State Sales and Use Tax
SUBCHAPTER 7C-Local Government and Mecklenburg
County Sales and Use Tax Acts
CHAPTER 8-INTANGIBLES TAX DIVISION
CHAPTER 9-GASOLINE TAX DIVISION
SUBCHAPTER 9A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 9B-Gasoline Tax
SUBCHAPTER 9C-Special Fuels Tax
SUBCHAPTER 9D-Highway Fuel Use Tax
SUBCHAPTER 9E-Gasoline, Special Fuels and Kerosene
Inspection

CHAPTER 10-AD
CHAPTER

VALOREM TAX DIVISION

11-PROPERTY TAX COMMISSIONS

NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

TITLE 18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL

RULES

CHAPTER

2-GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

CHAPTER

3-PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

CHAPTER

4-CORPORATIONS DIVISION

CHAPTER

5-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

CHAPTER

6-SECURITIES DIVISION

CHAPTER

7-NOTARY PUBLIC DIVISION

DIVISION
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NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

TITLE 19A
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER lA-Organization of the Department
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Rulemaking Procedure
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Administrative Hearing Procedure
CHAPTER 2-DIvISION OF HIGHWAYS
SUBCHAPTER 2A-General Administration
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Highway Planning
SUBCHAPTER 2C-Secondary Roads
SUBCHAPTER 2D-Highway Operations
SUBCHAPTER 2E-Miscellaneous Functions
CHAPTER

3-DIvISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

3A-Administration
3B-Drivers Services Section
3C-Vehicle Services Section
3D-License and Theft Section
3E-Tax Audit Section
3F-Program Planning and Evaluation
3H-Governor's Highway Safety Program

CHAPTER 4-SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
SUBCHAPTER 4A-Duties and Responsibilities
SUBCHAPTER 4B-Personnel

CHAPTER

5-AsSISTANT SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT

SUBCHAPTER 5A-Automated Date Processing

SUBCHAPTER 5B-Fiscal
SUBCHAPTER 5C-Purchasing
CHAPTER 6-ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING
SUBCHAPTER 6A-Transportation Systems Planning
SUBCHAPTER 6B-Public Transportation Program
SUBCHAPTER 6C-Division of Aeronautics
SUBCHAPTER 6D-Bicycle and Bikeway Program
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NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 20
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TREASURER
CHAPTER 1-DEPARTMENTAL RULES
SUBCHAPTER 1A-Organization Rules
SUBCHAPTER 1B-Administrative Services
SUBCHAPTER 1C-Disbursement and Records Section
SUBCHAPTER 1D-The Escheat Fund of North Carolina
SUBCHAPTER 1E-Funds, Investments and Public Debt
Management
SUBCHAPTER 1F-Procedural Rights
CHAPTER

2-RETIREMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS

SUBCHAPTER 2A-Divisional Rules
SUBCHAPTER 2B-Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System
SUBCHAPTER 2C-Local Governmental Employees' Retirement System
2D-Division
of Health Benefits
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER 2E-N.C. Public Employees' Social Security
Agency
SUBCHAPTER 2F-Uniform Judicial Retirement System of
North Carolina
SUBCHAPTER 2G-Uniform Solicitorial Retirement System
SUBCHAPTER 2H-Uniform Clerks of Superior Court Retirement System
SUBCHAPTER 21 -The Legislative Retirement Fund
CHAPTER 3-LOCAL
CHAPTER 4-TAx
CHAPTER

GOVERNMENT COMMISSION

REVIEW BOARD

5-MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CONTROL

CHAPTER 6-N.C.

HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY

SUBCHAPTER 6A-General Provisions
SUBCHAPTER 6B-Rulemaking and Administrative Hear-

ing Procedures
6C-Single
Family Mortgage Purchase
SUBCHAPTER
Program
SUBCHAPTER 6E-Agency Participation in Federal Housing Assistance Payments Programs
SUBCHAPTER 6F-Technical Assistance Program
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NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 21
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARDS
CHAPTER 2-BOARD OF ARCHITECTURE
CHAPTER 4-AUCTIONEERS

COMMISSION

CHAPTER 6-BOARD OF BARBER EXAMINERS
SUBCHAPTER 6A-Departmental Rules
SUBCHAPTER 6B-Rulemaking Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 6C-Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 6D-Conduct of the Contested Case
SUBCHAPTER 6E-Decision in Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 6F-Barber Schools
SUBCHAPTER 6G-Barber School Instructors
SUBCHAPTER 6H-Barber School Owners and Managers
SUBCHAPTER 61 -Out-of-state Transfers
SUBCHAPTER 6J -Apprentice Barbers
SUBCHAPTER 6K-Registered Barber
SUBCHAPTER 6L-Barber Shops
SUBCHAPTER 6M-Barber Shop Inspectors
SUBCHAPTER 6N-Forms
CHAPTER

8-BOARD OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
EXAMINERS

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

8A-Departmental Rules
8B-Rulemaking Procedures
8C-Contested Cases
8D-Conduct of the Contested Case
8E-Decision in Contested Cases
8F-Examinations for Certified Public Accountant Applicants
8G-Professional Ethics and Conduct
8H-Reciprocity
81 -Revocation of Certificates
8J -Renewals and Registrations
8K-Professional Corporations
8L-Forms

CHAPTER 10-BOARD OF

CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS

CHAPTER 12-LICENSING BOARD FOR CONTRACTORS

CHAPTER 14-BOARD OF COSMETIC ART EXAMINERS
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SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

14A-Departmental Rules
14B-Rulemaking Procedures
14C-Contested Cases
14D-Conduct of the Contested Case
14E-Decision in Contested Cases
14F-Rules and Regulations Governing the
Licensing of Beauty Salons,
14G-Requirements for the Establishment of
Schools of Cosmetic Art
14H-Sanitation
141 -Operations of Schools of Cosmetic Art
14J -Curriculum
14K-Manicurist Training
14L-Teaching Staff
14M-Forms

CHAPTER 16-BOAIRD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS
SUBCHAPTER 16A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 16B-Licensure Examination; Dentists
SUBCHAPTER 16C-Licensure Examination; Dental

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
CHAPTER

Hygienist
16D-Provisional Licensure; Dentists
16E-Provisional Licensure; Dental Hygienist
16F-Professional Corporations
16G-Dental Hygienists
16H-Dental Assistants
161-Annual Renewal of Licenses; De1ntal
Hygienist
16J-Sanitation
16K-Dental School Extension Facilities
16L-Board of Dental Elections
16M-Fees Payable

18-BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF ELECTRICAL
CONTRACTORS

CHAPTER

20-BOARD OF REGISTRATION FOR FORESTERS

CHAPTER 22-BOARD OF HEARING AID DEALERS AND FITTERS
SUBCHAPTER 22A-Departmental Rules
SUBCHAPTER 22B-Rulemaking Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 22C-Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 22D-Conduct of the Contested Case
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SUBCHAPTER 22E-Decision in Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 22F-General Examination and

License

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

Provisions
22G-Renewals and Registrations
22H-Revocation of Licenses
221 -Examination of Clients
22J -Unethical Conduct
22K-Forms

CHAPTER 24-HOUSE MOVERS LICENSING BOARD
CHAPTER 26-BOARD OF LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS
CHAPTER 28-LANDSCAPE CONTRACTORS' REGISTRATION BOARD
CHAPTER 30-BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
CHAPTER 32-BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
SUBCHAPTER 32A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 32B-License to Practice Medicine
SUBCHAPTER 32C-Professional Corporations
SUBCHAPTER 32D-Approval of Assistant to Physician
SUBCHAPTER 32E-Approval of Registered Nurse Performing Medical Acts
SUBCHAPTER 32F-Biennial Registration
SUBCHAPTER 32G-Mobile Intensive Care
CHAPTER 34-BOARD OF MORTUARY SCIENCE
CHAPTER 36-BOARD OF NURSING
CHAPTER

40-BOARD OF OPTICIANS

CHAPTER 42-BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY
SUBCHAPTER 42A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 42B-License to Practice Optometry
SUBCHAPTER 42C-Professional Corporations
SUBCHAPTER 42D-Optometric Assistant and Technician
SUBCHAPTER 42E-Mode of Practice
SUBCHAPTER 42F-Rulemaking and Administrative Hearing Procedures

SUBCHAPTER 42G-Forms
SUBCHAPTER 42H-Preceptorships
SUBCHAPTER 421 -Preceptors
CHAPTER

44-BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC EXAMINATION AND
REGISTRATION
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CHAPTER 46-BOARD OF PHARMACY

CHAPTER 48-EXAMINING COMMITTEE OF PHYSICAL THERAPY
SUBCHAPTER 48A-Organization
SUBCHAPTER 48B-Types of Licenses
SUBCHAPTER 48C-Examinations
SUBCHAPTER 48D-Application for Licensure
SUBCHAPTER 48E-Certificates, Fees, Investigations, Record of Licensees

SUBCHAPTER 48F-Retention of License
SUBCHAPTER 48G-Rulemaking and Administrative Hearing Procedures

CHAPTER

50-BOARD

OF

EXAMINERS

PLUMBING

AND

HEATING

CONTRACTORS

CHAPTER 52-BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS

CHAPTER 54-BOARD

OF EXAMINERS OF PRACTICING
PSYCHOLOGISTS

CHAPTER

56-BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL
SURVEYORS

ENGINEERS AND

LAND

CHAPTER 58-REAL ESTATE LICENSING BOARD

CHAPTER

60-BOARD OF REFRIGERATION EXAMINERS

CHAPTER

62-SANITARIAN EXAMINERS

CHAPTER

64-BOARD OF EXAMINERS FOR SPEECH AND LANGUAGE
PATHOLOGISTS AND AUDIOLOGISTS

CHAPTER

66-VETERINARY MEDICAL BOARD

CHAPTER 68-BOARD OF WATCHMAKING AND REPAIRING
SUBCHAPTER 68A-Departmental Rules
SUBCHAPTER 68B-Rulemaking Procedures
SUBCHAPTER 68C-Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 68D-Conduct of the Contested Case
SUBCHAPTER 68E-Decision in Contested Cases
SUBCHAPTER 68F-General 4 Examination and License
Provisions

SUBCHAPTER 68G-Procedures for Revocation of Licenses
or Certificates

SUBCHAPTER 68H-Registrations and Renewals
SUBCHAPTER 681 -Forms
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70-BOARD OF WATER WELL CONTRACTOR EXAMINERS

SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER
SUBCHAPTER

70A-Departmental Rules
70B-Rulemaking Procedures
70C-Contested Cases
70D-Conduct of the Contested Case
70E-Decision in Contested Cases
70F-Rules and Regulations of the Board
70G-Revocation of Certificates
70H-Renewals and Registrations
701 -Forms
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APPENDIX B
AGENCY RULES UNDER N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-17 (1978)
This Appendix contains illustrative examples of rules adopted
by state agencies under the declaratory ruling section of the North
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act. Arrangement of the examples is from the simpler and less complete to the more
comprehensive.
Index
Board of Medical Examiners of the State of North
C arolin a ............................................. 82

(Similar rules have been adopted by the Board of Natural and Economic Resources.)
North Carolina Auctioneers Commission ................ 82
(Similar rules have been adopted by the Board of Chiropractic Examiners, Licensing Board of Contractors,
Board of Law Examiners, Board of Mortuary Science,
Board of Opticians, Board of Examiners in Optometry,
Board of Pharmacy, Examining Committee of Physical
Therapy, Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, Real Estate Licensing
Board, Board of Sanitarian Examiners, Milk Commission, Banking Commission, Board of Examiners for
Nursing Home Administrators, Board of Examiners of
Electrical Contractors and House Movers Licensing
Board.
North Carolina Board of Architecture .................. 84
(Similar rules have been adopted by the Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners, Board of Chiropractic Examiners, Board of Cosmetic Art Examiners,
Board of Dental Examiners, Hearing Aid Dealers and
Fitters Board, Board of Landscape Architects, Landscape Contractors Registration Board, Board of Examiners of Plumbing and Heating Contractors, Board of
Podiatry Examiners, Board of Examiners of Practicing
Psychologists, Board of Refrigeration Examiners, Board
of Examiners for Speech and Language Pathologists
and Audiologists, Veterinary Medical Board, Board of
Examiners in Watchmaking and Repairing and Board
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of Water Well Contractor Examiners.)
North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control ..............

86

Board of Medical Examiners of the State of North
Carolina
21 N.C. Adm. Code 32A.0007
(hereinafter cited N.C.A.C., the designation to use when requesting
copies of rules from the agency issuing them or from the Administrative Procedure Section of the Attorney General's Office. See
n.20 infra.)
.0007 DECLARATORY RULINGS
The board may consider the validity of a rule only when the
petitioner shows that circumstances are so changed since adoption
of the rule that such a ruling would be warranted, or that the rule
making record evidences a failure by the agency to consider specified relevant factors. The petitioner shall state the consequences of
a failure to issue a ruling.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A19;
Eff. February 1, 1976.

North Carolina Auctioneers Commission
21 N.C.A.C. 4.0301 to 4.0304
.0301 PETITION
Any aggrieved person may petition the board for a declaratory
ruling as to the validity of a rule or as to the applicability to a
given state of facts of a statute administered by the board or a rule
or order of the board.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 150A17 and 85B-3(f);
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. December 19, 1977.

.0302 FORM AND CONTENTS OF PETITION
The petition need not be in any special form, but it shall
contain:
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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a statement of the nature of petitioner's interest, including reasons for the submission of the petition;
a designation of the specific statutory provisions, rule, or
order in question;
a complete statement of the relevant facts;
a statement of the interpretation given the statutory provision, rule, or order by the petitioner;
a memorandum containing the reasons, including any legal authorities, in support of the interpretation of the
petitioner;
the name, address, telephone number, and signature of
each petitioner.

History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 150A11(1) and 85B-3(f);
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. December 19, 1977.

.0303 DISPOSITION OF PETITION
The board, through its executive secretary, will within 60 days,
either deny the petition, stating the reasons therefor, or issue a
declaratory ruling. Upon disposition, the petitioner will be notified.
However, the board may for good cause refuse to issue a declaratory ruling.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 150A17 and 85B-3(f);
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. December 19, 1977.

.0304 APPLICABILITY OF RULING
A declaratory ruling shall be applicable only to the factual situation alleged in the petition or set forth in the order. It shall not
be applicable to different factual situations or where additional
facts, not considered in the ruling, exist.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 150A17 and 85B-3(f);
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. December 19, 1977.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980

83

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 9
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:1

North CarolinaBoard of Architecture
21 N.C.A.C. 2.0501 to 2.0505
.0501 SUBJECTS OF DECLARATORY RULINGS
Any person substantially affected by a statute administered or
rule promulgated by the board may request a declaratory ruling as
to either the manner in which a statute or rule applies to a given
factual situation, if at all, or whether a particular board rule is
valid.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 83-4
and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. September 29, 1977.

.0502 SUBMISSION OF REQUEST FOR RULING
All requests for declaratory rulings shall be written and mailed
to the board. The container of the request should bear the notation: REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RULING. The request
must include the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

name and address of petitioner;
statute or rule to which petition relates;
concise statement of the manner in which petitioner is
aggrieved by the rule or statute or its potential appplication to him;
a statement of whether an oral hearing is desired, and if
so, the reason therefor.

History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 83-4
and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. September 29, 1977.

.0503 DISPOSITION OF REQUESTS
(a) When the board deems it appropriate to issue a declaratory ruling it shall issue such declaratory ruling within 60 days of
receipt of the petition.
(b) A declaratory ruling proceeding may consist of written
submissions, an oral hearing, or other procedure as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular request.
(c) Whenever the board believes "for good cause" that the
issuance of a declaratory ruling is undesirable, it may refuse to issue such ruling. The board will notify the petitioner of its decision
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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in writing, stating the reasons for the denial of the declaratory
ruling.
(d) For purposes of Subpart (c) of this Rule, the board will
ordinarily refuse to issue a declaratory ruling for the following
reasons:
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

unless the petitioner shows that the circumstances are so
changed since the adoption of the rule that such a ruling
would be warranted;
unless the petitioner shows that the agency did not give
to the factors specified in the request for a declaratory
ruling a full consideration at the time the rule was issued;
where there has been a similar controlling factual determination in a contested case, or where the factual context
being raised for a declaratory ruling was specifically considered upon the adoption of the rule or directive being
questioned, as evidenced by the rule-making record;
where the subject matter of the request is involved in
pending litigation in any state or federal court in North
Carolina.

History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. § 83-4
and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. September 29, 1977.

.0504 RECORD OF DECISION
A record of all declaratory rule-making proceedings will be
maintained in the board office for as long as the ruling is in effect
and for five years thereafter. This record will contain: the request,
the notice, all written submissions filed in the request, whether
filed by the petitioner or any other person, and a record or summary of oral presentations, if any. Records of rule-making proceedings will be available for public inspection during the regular office
hours of the board office.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 83-4
and 150A-11;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. September 29, 1977.

.0505 EFFECTIVE DATE
For the purposes of Rule .0504 of this Section, a declaratory
ruling shall be deemed to be "in effect": until the statute or rule
interpreted by the declaratory ruling is amended, altered or rePublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1980
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pealed; until the board changes the declaratory ruling prospectively for good reasons; or until any court sets aside the ruling in
litigation between the board and the party requesting the rule; or
until any court of the Appellate Division of the General Court of
Justice shall construe the statute or rule which is subject of the
declaratory ruling in a manner plainly irreconcilable with the declaratory ruling.
North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control
4 N.C.A.C. 2B.0401 to 2B.0412
.0401 DEFINITION
"Aggrieved party" shall mean any person substantially affected by any statute or regulation administered or promulgated
by the North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control and who shall be
entitled to request a declaratory ruling in appropriate
circumstances.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.

.0402 ISSUANCE: GROUNDS
Upon request of an aggrieved party, except where the board
for good cause finds issuance of a ruling undesirable, the board
shall issue a declaratory ruling if the request for such ruling will:
(1)
(2)

determine the validity of a regulation previously adopted
by the board; or
determine the applicability of a particular statute, or regulation administered or adopted by the board to a given
specific fact situation.

History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.

.0403 REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RULING; VALIDITY
OF REGULATION
(a) All requests for a declaratory ruling contesting the validity of a regulation previously adopted by the board shall be written
and submitted upon an official "Request for Declaratory Ruling"
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9

86

Dickson: Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies

1980]

ADVISORY RULINGS

form which may be obtained from the Administrator's Office,
North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control, Post Office Box 25249,
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611. This form requires the following
information:
(1) name and address of aggrieved party,
(2) statute or regulation to which the request relates,
(3) names and addresses of additional third parties known to
the aggrieved party who may possibly be affected by the
requested ruling,
(4) statertent whether or not the aggrieved party is aware of
any pending board action or court action relating to the
validity of the regulation,
(5) a brief statement of the arguments and legal authority
supporting the party's contention that the regulation is
invalid, and
(6) statement of whether or not a conference is desired and
reasons for requesting a conference.
(b) The completed request form and any supporting materials
deemed relevant to the request shall be sent to the administrator,
North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control, Post Office Box 25249,
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611.
(c) The administrator shall make an initial determination
whether to grant or deny a request for a declaratory ruling. In
making this initial determination, the merits of the request and
the significance of issues raised shall be considered.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.

.0404 GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF RULING ON VALIDITY
A request for a declaratory ruling to determine the validity of
a regulation may be denied unless:
(1) It is shown that since the adoption of the regulation by
the board, circumstances have so changed such that a declaratory ruling is warranted; or
(2) It is shown that in the record of the rule-making hearing
which was held upon the regulation in question, the
board failed to consider specified relevant matters.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A-
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15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.
.0405 REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RULING: SPECIFIC
FACT SITUATIONS
(a) All requests for a declaratory ruling to determine the applicability of a particular statute or regulation administered or
adopted by the board to a given specific fact situation shall be
written and submitted upon an official "Request for Declaratory
Ruling" form which may be obtained from the administrator's office, North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control, Post Office Box
25249, Raleigh, North Carolina 27611. This form requires the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)

(7)

(8)

name and address of aggrieved party;
statute or regulation to which the request relates;
a brief statement of the manner in which the aggrieved
party is affected or may be affected by the statute or
regulation;
names and addresses of additional third parties known to
the aggrieved party who may possibly be affected by the
requested ruling;
complete and accurate statement of all material facts;
statement whether or not the aggrieved party is aware of
any pending board action or court action which may bear
on the applicability of the statute, rule or regulation to
the party's particular situation;
brief statement of the arguments and legal authority supporting the party's position on the applicability of this
statute, rule or regulation; and
statement of whether or not a conference is desired and
reasons for requesting conference.

The aggrieved party shall sign and verify the request before an
officer qualified to administer oaths that the information supplied
in the request form is true and accurate.
(b) The completed request form and any supporting materials deemed relevant to the request shall be sent to the administrator, North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control, Post Office Box
25249, Raleigh, North Carolina 27611.
(c) The administrator shall make an initial determination
whether to grant or deny a request for a declaratory ruling. In
making this initial determination the merits of the request and the
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/9
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significance of issues raised shall be considered.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.

.0406 GROUNDS FOR DENIAL; PENDING CONTROVERSY
The board will not issue a declaratory ruling when the issue or
issues presented by the aggrieved party are the subject of a matter
pending before the board or in a court of law.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.

.0407 WITHDRAWAL OF REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY
RULING
At any time prior to issuance, the board in its discretion may
permit an aggrieved party to withdraw the request for a declaratory ruling, any such request for withdrawal to be in writing.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.

.0408 NOTICE OF DENIAL OF REQUEST
If the administrator denies a request for a declaratory ruling,
the aggrieved party shall be notified promptly in writing, and in no
event later than 60 days from receipt of such request. The notice
shall state the reasons for denial of the request.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted November 1, 1977.

.0409 ISSUANCE OF RULING
(a) If the administrator grants a request for a declaratory
ruling, he may allow relevant written materials and comments, oral
arguments and any other evidence which he deems appropriate for
a fair determination of the issues in question. The administrator
may determine when all materials or arguments are to be filed or
made.
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(b) Notice of Preliminary Action to Third Parties. Where a
ruling will possibly affect third persons the administrator shall notify such persons and allow them an opportunity to present written
comments or oral arguments regarding the issuance of a declaratory ruling. However, if the request for a declaratory ruling is
merely to determine the applicability of a statute, rule or regulation to a unique factual situation, no notice to third persons shall
be necessary.
(c) The administrator, within 10 days of receipt of the request, shall notify the aggrieved party and any third persons of the
time for filing and presentation of written comments and oral arguments. Oral arguments shall be made informally before the administrator at the offices of the North Carolina Board of Alcoholic
Control in Raleigh, North Carolina.
(d) After hearing oral arguments and reviewing written evidence challenging the validity of a regulation, the administrator
shall prepare a statement of the facts and issues. The aggrieved
party's request and all supporting comments and materials, together with the administrator's statement of facts and issues shall
be presented to the board for consideration and issuance of a ruling. The administrator shall notify the aggrieved party within a
reasonable time before the board meeting that he shall be allowed
to appear before the board and present additional oral evidence in
support of his request.
(e) Where the administrator has received a request for a ruling on the applicability of a statute, rule or regulation to a specific
fact situation, and he has heard arguments and reviewed written
evidence supporting the request, he shall prepare a statement of
the facts and issues and may issue a declaratory ruling which shall
be binding without any board action. Provided, however, the administrator may submit any request for a ruling on the applicability of a statute or regulation to the board for issuance of the declaratory ruling.
History Note:

Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.

.0410 EFFECT OF DECLARATORY RULING
A declaratory ruling shall be binding upon the board in its
dealings with the party requesting the ruling unless the board finds
a misstatement of a material fact, or the failure to state a material
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fact, the omission of which makes the request misleading. However, the board shall not be bound by such declaratory ruling in
dealing with third parties where the board, for good cause, believes
that a different course of action is justified and that a ruling
should be changed with respect to different persons or fact
situations.
History Note: Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.
.0411 ALTERATION OF DECLARATORY RULING
The board, on its own motion, or upon the motion of any interested person may change or modify a declaratory ruling previously issued, by the adoption of a new or different ruling. Such
subsequent ruling shall apply prospectively only.
History Note: Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14),
150A-11(l) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.
.0412 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECLARATORY RULINGS
For purposes of judicial review, the board shall preserve any
and all requests for rulings, written comments by interested parties, any manuscripts or summaries of oral proceedings, any matter
considered by the administrator or board in making the decision,
and the decision together with the reasons therefor.
History Note: Statutory Authority N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 18A15(14), 150A-11(1) and 150A-17;
Eff. February 1, 1976;
Readopted Eff. November 1, 1977.
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